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When consumers are imperfectly informed about the quality of a prod-
uct, market forces do not incentivize firms to provide the socially optimal level 
of quality. Imperfect information is a recognized and frequent market failure 
in the context of public health and has led to initiatives aimed at increasing 
consumers’ access to information and at incentivizing firms to provide higher 
quality services. This study analyzes the welfare effects of quality disclosure 
and quality subsidies on the Medicare Advantage (MA) market. MA is a sub-
sidized program that provides health insurance to the elderly and disabled 
population in the U.S. as an alternative to Traditional Medicare.
The study begins by introducing the institutional background of the 
market that provides a unique setup to analyze. On the demand side, con-
sumers receive information on the quality of health insurance plans through a
vii
Star Rating System (SRS). On the supply side, higher-rated insurers receive
a quality-linked subsidy through a Quality Bonus Program (QBP).
The second chapter provides evidence that consumers do not respond
to the information they receive. The question then arises, “Why is this hap-
pening?” Is is because consumers are not aware of the SRS? Is it because
consumers do not value the information they receive through the SRS? Or, is
it because consumers do not care about the dimension of quality the SRS is
informing them on? At the same time, star ratings increase over time. Sim-
ple density distribution graphs suggest that this increase is motivated by the
financial incentives that QBP provides insurers with. Those two observations
raise the question of what the relative impacts of the two policies together are
on welfare.
The third chapter describes a survey I designed and conducted to an-
swer the first set of questions regarding the demand side of the market–Do
consumer know about the SRS? Do consumers value the information they
receive? Do consumers about the dimension of quality the star ratings are
informing them on?–Surveying Medicare-eligible individuals, I find that 80%
of the population is unaware of the SRS. In the survey, I also conduct a con-
joint analysis to elicit preferences for star ratings. I find that respondents who
reported they were aware of the SRS place a monthly value of $25 on an extra
star rating; slightly more than the ones who reported they were unaware.
The fourth chapter presents a structural equilibrium model of supply
and demand that separately identifies and quantifies the relative impacts of
viii
each policy on welfare. The model also incorporates the survey results by flex-
ibly allowing for different consumer types: those who are unaware and those
who do not care about the SRS. I combine the survey stated preference with re-
vealed preference choice data and estimate a Bayesian learning discrete choice
model. On the supply side, insurers endogenously choose price and quality.
My analysis shows that although both the SRS and the QBP lead to higher
quality, welfare improvement is very small compared to the incurred costs. In
particular, 75% of the expenditures spent on the QBP is not rationalized by
any welfare improvement.
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When consumers are imperfectly informed about the quality of a prod-
uct, market forces are thought not to provide the correct incentives for firms
to invest in the socially optimal level of quality. This has long been known
and dates back to [8], [7], [86]. This observation has led many public and pri-
vate initiatives to provide consumers with better product quality information,
including Consumer Reports, Yelp reviews, health departments’ restaurant hy-
giene scores, and school performance information. However, the provision of
product quality information may provide firms insufficient incentives (from a
welfare perspective) for quality investments. This may be because of remain-
ing information frictions, the inability of performance measures to capture the
relevant quality domains, or firm market power. When this is true, the govern-
ment can intervene and provide direct incentives for firms to invest in product
quality. They can do this through testing (e.g., pharmaceuticals), licensure
(e.g., physicians), or, as this study analyzes, through direct quality subsidies.
In my thesis, I study the Medicare Advantage (MA) Star Rating System
(SRS). MA is a program that allows Medicare beneficiaries to bypass the
Traditional Medicare (TM) program, which provides health insurance to the
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elderly and disabled population in the U.S., and enroll in a private plan that is
responsible for the care they receive. The plans receive a subsidy payment for
each of their enrollees. The SRS measures the performance of these MA plans
using more than 40 measures and then maps the outcomes of these measures
into a single-dimensional star rating between 1 and 5 in half-star increments
for each plan. The SRS was introduced in 2008. Beginning in 2012, the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), the agency that oversees
the Medicare program, instituted a policy, named Quality Bonus Program
(QBP), that linked the subsidies the MA plans receive to their star rating.
In my dissertation, I study the impact of the SRS and the QBP on consumer
demand, plan pricing and quality, and ultimately, welfare.
Although it is generally accepted that both policies can improve quality,
and probably welfare, they can also entail significant costs: costs that refer
to spending for generating the relevant information and its delivery to con-
sumers, and costs for the bonuses insurers receive. Then, the arising question
is whether the incurred cost is justified by the welfare improvement the market
may experience. The answer depends on both the “demand-and supply-side”
environment of the market. On the demand side, three factors are critical.
First, to what extent are consumers aware of the information they receive?
Second, to what extent do consumers value the information they receive?
Third, to what extent do consumers have significant preferences for the part
of quality the SRS is informing them on? On the supply side, it is critical to
understand how insurers are incentivized to produce and price quality given
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the demand structure and the financial incentives they receive. For example,
when consumers are not aware of the available information, insurers do not
have strong incentives to produce high quality plans. Even worse, they can
impose high prices on low-quality plans taking advantage of consumers’ inac-
curate beliefs about quality. Similarly, when consumers do not value quality,
insurers do not have any incentive to invest in it, unless they receive extra
bonuses for doing so. In this scenario, although quality increases, consumer
surplus remains unaffected leaving the cost of the bonuses unjustified.
I begin my analysis by providing evidence that consumers do not care
about star ratings, but at the same time they are enrolled in high quality
plans. This is not very surprising as health insurance markets are notorious
for the high levels of inattention they are plagued by. Also, the data show
that the market experiences significant quality improvement over time that
is mainly due to the financial incentives insurers receive through the QBP.
These two observations together raise the main question of this study: “What
are the relative impacts of the SRS and the QBP on welfare?” Knowing to
what extent the combination of the implemented policies can lead to better
outcomes and to what extent the cost that is incurred is justified by wel-
fare improvement is important from an economic perspective. Furthermore,
knowing what combination of policies works better can lead to better policy
recommendations.
I build a full demand and supply equilibrium model to study whether
the combination of the implemented policies improves welfare and to what
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extent the obtained cost is justified. On the demand side, I investigate how
consumers form beliefs about quality and how much they value the information
that is provided to them. In doing so, I build a Bayesian learning discrete
choice model in the spirit of [26], which also introduces a type of information
friction that refers to consumer awareness with respect to the SRS. On the
supply side, I investigate whether insurers under- or over-provide quality in
building a model in which firms choose prices and quality while they endogenize
the information environment and the financial incentives they receive.
Introducing a type of friction that refers to awareness is a novel part
of this study. Although previous research has acknowledged the importance of
information awareness, to the best of my knowledge data limitations have pre-
vented empirical investigation of this friction before this study. In aggregate
or individual choice-level data, consumers who do not care about a product
characteristic are observationally equal to consumers who do not know about
it. Usually, the literature assumes perfect information, fully attributing con-
sumer choices to preferences. However, it is possible that, if consumers had
known about this product characteristic, they would care about it. In such
a case, the assumption of perfect information leads to wrong welfare impli-
cations. Distinguishing these consumer types is not always necessary, but in
a study such as mine that analyzes two policies that heavily depend on the
information environment it is critical for welfare predictions. To the best of
my knowledge, I am the first to empirically investigate this type of information
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friction.1
I model consumer preferences for quality with a random coefficient
that is governed by a normal distribution with a mass point at zero, and I
allow consumers to make their choices according to their preferences, as in
[13]. The challenge arises in distinguishing consumers who are not aware of
the SRS from consumers who do not care about quality. To overcome this
challenge, I design and run an electronic survey that yields unique data on
624 nationally representative Medicare-eligible individuals. In the survey, I
recover the proportion of consumers who were aware/unaware of the SRS,
and I further elicit preferences for star ratings. To recover the proportion of
consumers who were aware of the SRS, I directly ask respondents whether
they knew anything about it. To elicit preferences for star ratings, I conduct a
conjoint experiment in the spirit of [11], providing respondents a series of choice
sets to choose from with a trade-off between prices and star ratings. I find that
77.4% of the Medicare population is unaware of the SRS. I estimate respondent
preferences using the method of Simulated Maximum Likelihood. Results from
the conjoint analysis show that 17% of the initially aware respondents did not
care about the star ratings, and 25% of the newly aware respondents did
not care about star ratings. Overall, initially aware respondents assign a $25
monthly value per star as compared to respondents who were newly aware,
1More recently, [2] develop a method to estimate discrete choice models in which, when
the assumptions of a canonical model are combined with a set of mild restrictions, the use
of choice data only is sufficient to identify consumer preferences when choices are not fully
informed. Their model has not yet been applied empirically.
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who assigned a $20 monthly value per star.
I proceed by estimating the main Bayesian learning demand model. In
my setup, consumers have some prior beliefs about MA plan quality before the
introduction of the SRS. After the introduction of the SRS, consumers that are
aware of it, update their beliefs based on the signals the star ratings give them.
If consumers are not aware of the SRS, they behave as if they were in the pre-
SRS period based on their prior beliefs. I impose the consumer preferences for
star ratings I recovered in the survey on my main demand model to estimate
the rest of the model parameters.
My estimation follows [76] and the algorithm used by [14]. The key
point of estimation exploits a population moment condition that requires a set
of exogenous instrumental variables to form a non-linear Generalized Method
of Moments estimator. Combining stated preference choice survey data with
revealed preference choice aggregate data requires me to control for possible
differences in the idiosyncratic tastes of the survey respondents and the actual
consumers. In doing so, I use a rescale parameter which also has the advantage
of preserving the shape of the preference distribution that I recovered from
the survey in the main model. The estimates predict that consumers are
moderately elastic with respect to price, with own price elasticity close to -
1.16. The most valuable benefit for consumers is drug coverage; consumers are
willing to pay up to $170/month for drug coverage, which is six times more
than what they are willing to pay for an extra star rating.
Once I estimate the demand parameters, I use them to separately esti-
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mate the “supply-side” parameters. In my model, insurers choose both prices
and quality, endogenizing the information environment and the financial in-
centives they receive from Medicare. I utilize the competitive environment of
the market, and after I invert the first-order conditions for prices, I recover
insurers’ implied marginal cost of the services they provide. I assume that in-
surers cannot perfectly predict the final level of star rating that will arise, since
there is a long list of metrics that determine the final outcome. I generate a
continuous measure of quality, given CMS’s provided algorithms. Then, I uti-
lize the considerable variation I observe around the thresholds at which a new
star rating is assigned, and estimate via the Simulated Maximum Likelihood
method the parameter that governs insurers’ uncertainty when they decide the
quality level they will produce. I find that an extra star rating costs insurers
slightly less than $25/month and that the final level of quality that results is
noisy with a standard deviation of 1.4 stars. Finally, I provide evidence that
the model I estimate fits the data remarkably well.
In my counterfactual analyses, I quantify the relative impacts of the
SRS and the QBP on firm profitability, consumer surplus, and government
expenditures. I compare outcomes that arise under three different levels of
information structure: (i) full information, (ii) current level of information,
and (iii) no information, and two supply-side regulatory environments: (i)
with and (ii) without quality subsidies. Not surprisingly, I find that both
the SRS and QBP improve quality. As consumers become more aware of
the existing information, plan quality goes up. Similarly, when insurers are
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provided financial incentives to improve quality, they do so.
Interestingly, although both policies improve quality significantly, con-
sumer surplus only increases modestly. This pattern is observed either because
consumers do not value the dimension of quality the star ratings represent or
because star ratings are not good signals of quality. On average, firms become
less profitable as consumers become more informed about the SRS. This is
not surprising. When consumers are not aware of the true plan quality, firms
impose high prices on low-quality plans and thus become profitable.
Further, I find that the same level of quality that is observed in practice
through the combination of “demand-and supply-side” policies can be achieved
through the “demand-side” policy alone if the informed share of the population
increased from 22% to 50%. This result suggests that the government may be
able to avoid the substantial costs of the QBP, which amount to $1.7b per
year, if it can find a more cost effective way of informing consumers about
plan quality.
The striking finding of my analysis is that the cost that is incurred to
increase quality via bonus subsidies is not justified by the total welfare improve-
ment. Of the $1.7b Medicare spends annually on average to improve welfare
via the QBP, only 25% is rationalized by the increased aggregate surplus that
flows to consumers and producers. My analysis defines welfare traditionally
as the sum of consumer surplus and firm profitability without taking into ac-
count any other benefits that might be realized due to higher quality. Hence,
it remains unclear whether the part of the Medicare expenditures that is not
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rationalized generates a positive externality or whether it is just lost. How-
ever, my analysis suggests that, for a star rating to justify the extra spending,
it should generate a positive externality close to the amount of $6b annually.
The remainder of the study proceeds as follows. Section 1.1 presents
the institutional background on the MA market and the policies of interest.
Section 1.2 describes the literature to which this paper is related. Chapter
2 describes the data and provides a preliminary analysis of the first major
observations. Chapter 3 describes the survey I conducted and analyzes in
detail the results that arose. Chapter 4 describes the empirical framework for
the demand and the supply side model along with the results and the welfare
analysis. Chapter 5 concludes the study.
1.1 Institutional Background
Medicare, enacted in 1965, is a public program that provides health
insurance to the elderly and disabled population in the U.S. regardless of
income or medical history.2 It is the largest health insurance program in the
country, and as of 2020 it comprised 3% of the Gross Domestic Product. It is
currently managed by the CMS and covers hospital care (Part A) and medical
care (Part B). Since 2006, it has also been providing prescription drug coverage
(Part D). Under its fee-for-service structure, also known as TM, providers
that choose to participate in the program are required to treat beneficiaries
2Disabilities mainly refer to End Stage Renal Disease and Amyotropic Lateral Sclerosis.
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in exchange for a reimbursement. Beneficiaries pay a fixed annual amount
for Parts A and B as well as fixed copays, coinsurance rates, and deductibles,
depending on the medical care they receive.
1.1.1 The Medicare Advantage program
MA allows beneficiaries to opt out of traditional fee-for-service Medi-
care and enroll in a private insurance plan. The program, originally called
Medicare+Choice (Part C), originates in the Tax Equity and Fiscal Respon-
sibility Act of 1982, which targeted the expansion of plan options and cost
reduction as a result of the managed care competition. MA plans must pro-
vide at least Part A and B coverage; sometimes they also offer Part D coverage.
Beneficiaries choosing an MA plan receive medical benefits from their plan ex-
clusively. Although at first the program did not receive a lot of attention, its
popularity has increased during the last twenty years. In 2019, 95% of Medi-
care beneficiaries had the option of choosing an MA plan in their county, and
MA plans served 33% of the Medicare population.3
After MA insurers have proven they meet a series of financial and ad-
ministrative criteria, they sign contracts with Medicare for the set of plans
they will offer to different counties.4 A contract refers to a specific product
type, such as a Health Maintenance Organization (HMO), Preferred Provider
Organization (PPO), and Private Fee For Service (PFFS), that covers specific
3See [71] for details regarding the history of MA.
4They need to prove that they can bear the financial cost of offering plans. They are
also required to build the necessary infrastructure for their plans to operate efficiently.
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geographical areas and includes a set of plans that all share the same network
of providers.5 A plan refers to a specific combination of premium, copayment,
coinsurance rate, deductible, and other benefits, such as drug, vision, dental,
and hearing. Each insurer is required to provide at least one plan offering Part
D benefits; these plans are called MA-PD plans.
Insurers that choose to participate in the program have to fully ac-
cept the risk patients carry.6 In exchange for the services insurers offer, they
receive a monthly payment per patient. This payment depends on risk ad-
justed benchmark (capitation) rates that Medicare determines depending on
the per capita fee-for-service spending within a county.7 Every year after the
release of the benchmark rates, insurers submit a “bid” for each plan they offer
depending on their cost. If the submitted “bid” is above the county bench-
mark, the insurer receives an amount equal to the benchmark, and to cover
the difference, adds extra charges to the standard Part B and/or to any sup-
plemental premiums. If the submitted “bid” is below the county benchmark,
5HMOs deliver care through providers who work directly for the insurance firm. Bene-
ficiaries who buy these plans are required to choose their primary provider, and they must
have a referral to visit a specialist. HMO enrollees may see a non-network provider, but
they will have to pay extra. HMOs also have restrictions on the number of visits, tests,
or treatments their enrollees can receive. PPOs are similar to HMOs, but they are more
flexible in terms of networks, patients’ ability to see specialists, plan costs, and coverage
for out-of-network services. Finally, PFFS plans resemble TM plans in access, benefits,
and reimbursement to providers; PFFS offers a flat reimbursement rate per procedure, and
providers can choose on a case-by-case or service-by-service basis whether or not to accept
patients.
6Risk refers to the risk beneficiaries carry associated with their heath status.
7For different plans an insurer offers, the insurer can receive different levels of reimburse-
ment.
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the insurer receives an amount equal to the “bid” and an additional “rebate”
(as a reward), the amount of which is a fixed percentage share of the differ-
ence between the “bid” and the benchmark.8 Insurers are required to pass the
actuarial value of the “rebate” to enrollees through additional benefits or by
reducing the standard Part B premium. Consequently, insurers compete with
each other on premiums, and more recently they have started competing on
dimensions of quality, such as benefit design, size of network and advertising.
([29], [6], [73])
Medicare beneficiaries are automatically signed up for Medicare if they
receive Social Security or Railroad Retirement Board benefits or submit an
application by calling the Medicare line. Every year during the Open Enroll-
ment period (October, 15 – December, 7), beneficiaries are offered a variety of
plans in the county they live. To find information about the available plans,
they can visit Medicare’s Plan Finder website (https://www.medicare.gov)
or read the CMS “Medicare & You” handbook. Additionally, they are pro-
vided with information by the insurers’ advertisements. Finally, they have the
option to consult with counselors from the State Health Insurance Program
and/or independent brokers. Within this period and according to their needs,
beneficiaries choose to either enroll in an MA plan or receive coverage from
TM.9
8At the beginning of my data, the “rebate” was equal to 75% of the difference between the
“bid” and the benchmark. After the introduction of the QBP program, this fixed percentage
changed depending on the star ratings each plan received. See more details in section 1.1.3.
9In case they first become eligible for Medicare during a different period or a major life
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From a beneficiary’s point of view, the decision between TM and MA
involves a trade-off of higher out-of-pocket cost in return for less restrictive
coverage. Typically, TM enrollees face high out-of-pocket costs, which they
cover by buying supplemental Medigap policies. In contrast, MA plans offer
more generous cost sharing and may also provide extra benefits, such as vision,
dental, hearing, and drug coverage. However unlike TM, MA plans impose
limited access to providers. Most MA beneficiaries are enrolled in either HMO
or PPO plans, with various restrictions on the provider networks.
1.1.2 The Star Rating System
CMS began constructing and publishing MA and Medicare Part D star
ratings in 2008. The overarching goal of the star rating initiative is to provide
beneficiaries information on plan quality to facilitate better plan choice. The
ratings are presented on a scale from 1 to 5 in half-star increments.
The rules governing the assignment of a final star rating to an insurer
are complicated and have changed over time.10 Broadly speaking, a variety of
data sources (coming from the Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers
and Systems (CAHPS) and the Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Informa-
tion Set (HEDIS) surveys) is used to collect information on a set of 30 to 44
performance measures spanning 5 to 9 categories, which are aligned with the
change happens, they have the option to enroll at any time of the year. More recently, they
also have the option to enroll in a 5-star plan at any time of the year.
10Section 1.1 in the appendix analyzes in detail the main rules that govern the assignment
of star ratings to insurers.
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government’s goals. These measures are non-financial and refer to some of
the clinical outcomes of the plans’ enrollees, the way plans help their enrollees
manage their chronic conditions, member experience with the plan, access to
medical care, and customer service. CMS uses relative distribution and clus-
tering techniques to convert the original scores of these measures into star
ratings. Next, it uses a weighting system to summarize the individual star
ratings into an average “summary rate” that is rounded to the nearest half
star.11 Table 1.1 shows the exact measures along with the weights CMS used
in 2015. Star ratings are assigned at a contract level, and every plan under
the same contract gets the same star rating. Contracts receiving less than two
star ratings are excluded from the market until they improve their quality.
Every year, before the enrollment period begins, CMS officially dis-
closes star ratings along with other plan characteristics on Medicare’s Plan
Finder website. Beneficiaries can visit Plan Finder to compare plans in dif-
ferent dimensions. Figure 1.1 provides an example of the plan characteristics
beneficiaries see and compare on Plan Finder. It is important to notice in this
example that as star ratings reflect a dimension of quality that refers to cus-
tomer satisfaction and general clinical outcomes, they are distinguished from
the general benefit design of a plan. Other sources where beneficiaries can
find information about star ratings are insurers’ websites and/or their mail-
11For example, a plan with a 3.75 summary rate is rounded up to a 4-star rating, while
a plan with a 3.74 summary rate is rounded down to a 3.5-star rating. For MA plans
offering Part D benefits (MA-PD), Part C and D “summary rates” are combined to create
an “overall rate”. For MA plans not offering Part D benefits, the “summary rate” is also
the “overall rate”.
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ings. However, it is important to mention that insurers are not mandated to
disclose star rating information. Even when they do so, it is often the case
that consumers put costly effort to find the relevant information compared
to the effort they put to find information with respect to other plan charac-
teristics. Lastly, although beneficiaries can generally find information about
plan characteristics in the “Medicare” handbook, that is distributed to them
annually, CMS chooses not to include star ratings information in the book.
All these observations together imply that consumers may sign up for plans
without being aware of star ratings.
Criticisms on the SRS: The SRS has been criticized for its use both on
the demand side and the supply side. On the demand side, the main concerns
refer to its use as a guide to consumers choosing among MA plans. As men-
tioned, a major concern refers to the possibility that consumers choose MA
plans without knowing anything about the star ratings information. In addi-
tion, the complexity of the SRS and the abundance of information a final star
rating conveys make it difficult for consumers to understand and process it so
that they can use it effectively in their choice decision. On the supply side,
the main concern refers to the possibility that insurers “manipulate” the SRS
as a quality metric system. Although CMS has been changing the rules it fol-
lows to assign the final star ratings,12 insurers are aware of the main algorithm
CMS follows along with the metrics that are heavily weighted. Hence, insur-
12These changes refer to the weights each metric is assigned with, the specific measures
it uses, etc. Sometimes these changes are pre-announced, whereas other times they are
sudden.
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ers can either invest in quality targeting metrics that are “easier” for them
to increase or they can “game” the system showing that they are of higher
quality when their actual quality does not change. In this study, I focus on
the possibility that consumers might be “unaware” of the SRS. Further, my
analysis assumes that insurers target an overall star rating instead of specific
metrics and excludes the possibility of star ratings manipulation and leaves it
for future analysis. These concerns are left for future analysis.
1.1.3 The Quality Bonus Program
The QBP originates in the amendments of the 2010 Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act, which targeted quality improvement of health in-
surance plans. It is the first Pay-For-Performance program in the market for
health insurance and provides insurers different levels of bonuses depending
on the star rating they receive.13 In March 2010, CMS announced that as of
the beginning of 2012 contracts receiving 4 or more star ratings would receive
a 5% higher benchmark rate than all other contracts. To further incentivize
more insurers to increase quality, in November 2010, Medicare decided to begin
the program with a “demonstration project”. This “demonstration project”
would last for three years (2012 – 2014) and would expand bonuses to plans
receiving lower star ratings. In 2015, the original bonus scheme plan went into
13Pay-For-Performance programs are not new. They have been used in many industries,
and recently they have been used in the healthcare sector to incentivize providers to improve
their quality.
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effect.14 Table 1.2 shows how the bonus schemes of the program evolved over
time.15
Bonus payments are paid per enrollee and are calculated as a share of
the MA benchmarks, which vary by county. Lastly, bonuses for new contracts
are 3.5% of the benchmark, and plans failing to report their quality do not
receive any bonus payments.
1.1.4 Summary of the payment structure after the implementation
of SRS and QBP
The period between the data collection and the final release of star rat-
ings lasts two years. During this period, providers deliver healthcare services,
CAHPS and HEDIS data are released, and CMS collects these data and calcu-
lates the final star ratings. In the meantime, insurers choose their prices and
the star ratings they will target each year, consumers choose the plans that
match their needs, and CMS pays insurers accordingly. The following example
describes this sequence of events covering a two-year period (January 2019 –
December 2020):
1. From January 2019 to August 2019, insurers deliver healthcare services
to their enrollees.
14The demonstration project also allowed bonuses for contracts in some counties with
special demographic characteristics to be double.
15Since the implementation of the QBP, the rebates, as defined by a “fixed” percentage
of the difference between the benchmark rates and the “bids”, have also changed. Table 1.3
shows exactly how they have evolved over time.
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2. Based on the insurer performance during this period, CAHPS and HEDIS
measures are released in September 2019.
3. From January 2020 to September 2020, CMS collects these data and
calculates the star ratings for the enrollment period of 2021. During
this period, it also announces changes that may occur regarding the
calculation of the star ratings in the future.
4. In October 2020, the star ratings are released for the plans that will serve
the market in 2021.
5. After the release of the star ratings, the benchmark rates will be finalized
and insurers will submit their bids.
6. The official enrollment period is between October, 15th – December, 7th
2020. During this period, consumers see the plans offered in the area
they live, observe prices, star ratings and other plan characteristics, and
decide which plan they will enroll in.
7. The final CMS payment is given to every insurer.
Figure 1.2 also shows a graphical representation of the above example. In
summary, the final payment from CMS to an MA insurer for a plan j he offers
in market m and year t is determined as follows:
Paymentjmt =

Bmt ·RAjt · ψjt if bidjt ≥ Bmt
(bidjt + ζjt (Bmt − bidjt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
rebatekjt
) ·RAjt · ψjt if bidjt < Bmt ,
(1.1)
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where Bmt represents the benchmark rates, RAjt represents the average risk
adjustment, ψjt is the bonus plans receive depending on the star rating they
receive, and ζjt is the fixed percentage rate of the rebate as it has evolved over
time.16 In case a plan also offers Part D benefits, the final payment will be a
sum of the above plus an additional amount that results from a similar bidding
system. The final premium of a plan is determined as follows:
pjmt =
{
bidjt − Paymentjmt if bidjt ≥ Bmt
0 otherwise
, (1.2)
and for plans that also offer Part D coverage an additional premium is added.
Criticisms on the QBP: The main concern around the QBP has always
been its cost. The first three years of the program increased the size of the
bonus payments as well as the number of contracts receiving them, providing
bonuses to the vast majority of MA contracts with total spending approaching
$8.35b. Part of this cost is rationalized by the consumer willingness to pay
for high-star plans. However, if consumers are not aware of the existence of
the SRS or if they are not willing to pay for high-star plans, then the question
that arises is whether there are more efficient ways through which the same
quality outcome can be realized at a lower cost.
16This fixed percentage rate ζjt varied over time. Before 2012 it was fixed at 75%, between
2012 and 2014 it was a blend of the pre- and post-that period rebate amounts, and after
2014 it started varying depending on plans’ star ratings; for plans receiving 4 – 4.5 stars it
was 70%, for plans receiving 3.5 – 4 stars it was 65%, and for the rest it was 50%. Table




My study closely relates to papers that analyze the welfare effects of
information provision on quality through reporting cards, star ratings ([9],
[94], [55], [56], [30], [63]), or advertising ([5], [82]). These papers assume
that information fully reaches consumers and, consequently, estimate the effect
of the information provision’s intent to treat with information provision. I
allow for the possibility that information may not fully reach consumers. I
identify the percent of consumers who are aware of the available information
and quantify the effect of the treatment of information provision on the treated
consumers.
My study extends the literature that analyzes different types of in-
formation frictions that result in imperfectly informed decision-makers. This
literature goes back to [8], who points out that imperfect information is a main
friction that prevents consumers from making efficient choice decisions.17 A
common type of information friction that researchers have focused on refers
to rational inattention where consumers decide not to avail themselves of the
information provided because of the cost of obtaining that information ([87],
[66], [21], [58], [59]). Another form of rational inattention refers to switching
or searching costs ([77], [51], [43] , [79], [97]). Other researchers have focused
on cases where consumers may not be able to comprehend information ([15],
17For an extended literature review on the quality of consumer decision-making in the
market for health insurance, see [60].
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[16]). Seminal papers in this category include [3], [4], [54], [53].18 I focus on a
type of friction that refers to awareness and is simply described by a situation
in which consumers are not aware that the information is available. [2] theo-
retically suggest a way to identify awareness levels using revealed preference
choice data. To the best of my knowledge, I am the first to empirically address
this friction and analyze the welfare outcomes that arise in a fully informed
market.
Closer to my study, [17] is concerned with potential limited price trans-
parency. While in his analysis he endogenizes the decisions of consumers to
become aware of the information, I treat awareness as an exogenous variable.
Methodologically, in his study, he uses website traffic log data to identify the
percent of the population that receives information. In contrast, I utilize sur-
vey data; website (PlanFinder) traffic log data would lead to biased results,
as a high percent of the website users are also researchers.
My study is related to a large body of literature that analyzes the Medi-
care Advantage program. Some studies in the MA literature have focused on
the pass-through rates of the MA subsidies to the final consumers ([85], [38],
[20]), while others have focused on adverse selection and its welfare implica-
tions ([64]). While most of these studies have focused on financial aspects
of quality, this paper focuses on non-financial aspects that are also welfare
relevant. Intuitively, my study is close to [6], who analyze the impact of in-
18For a full list of the literature, see [50].
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formation provision in the form of advertising. Methodologically, it is close to
[91] and [29], who build structural models for welfare analysis.
I significantly contribute to the part of the literature that analyzes the
SRA and the QBP. Existing studies have analyzed the two programs separately
from each other. [32] study the effects of star ratings on enrollment, finding
conflicting evidence across the different years of their analysis.19 [62] study
the effect of the bonus schemes on plan quality. My analysis is closer to that
of [89], who builds a structural model to analyze the equilibrium effects of
the “demonstration project”.20 To the best of my knowledge, I am the first
researcher to analyze both programs, quantifying the relative impact of each
one on welfare. Importantly, I treat star ratings as noisy signals of quality;
not as quality per se. On the demand side, I identify consumers who might be
unaware of the Star Rating System by surveying Medicare-eligible individuals.
I further conduct a conjoint experiment to quantify how much consumers value
star ratings, and I combine stated preference with revealed preference choice
data to estimate my demand model. Using survey data helps me assess both
consumers’ information set and preferences, as well as the joint distribution of
these two objects. Hence, I obtain very direct information on the explanations
of why star ratings might not have a significant impact on demand. On the
19In a different study ([67]), the authors also analyzed the effects of the SRS on the
premiums set by insurers and the total welfare.
20Recently, there has also been a growing branch of literature that focuses on potential
risk selection that can arise due to either the SRS or the QBP program on the demand or
the supply side of the market ([65], [35], [34], [45]). My study does not focus on any type of
selection.
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supply side, I model firms to compete on more than one dimension, as in [44]
and the more recent [73]. An innovative part of my study is the inclusion of a
quality targeting error that prevents insurers from targeting exactly a certain
quality level required to get a bonus. Lastly, I also allow firms to endogenize
the information environment when they make their decisions. This allows me
to investigate the effects of the financial incentives given to insurers separately
from demand-side effects.
Further, my study integrates techniques from the behavioral ([33], [69]),
marketing ([47], [70], [11]), and transport economics ([61], [23], [96], [24])
literature by collecting data via a survey design and using a conjoint analysis to
elicit preferences. Using conjoint experiments to estimate preferences has the
advantage of exogenously varying prices and star ratings resulting to demand
estimates that are not contaminated by endogeneity issues that usually arise
when estimating demand with standard revealed preference choice data.
With the exception of [52] in the health economics literature, this is
the first paper that combines stated preference and revealed preference choice
data to estimate a full equilibrium model in the Industrial Organization liter-
ature.21 The novel part of my methodology is that combining the information
and choice data from the survey with real data on MA plan choices and char-
acteristics, I estimate two different random coefficient demand models - one
21Studies that combine stated and revealed preferences data are usually found in the
behavioral, marketing, and transport economics literature. Some of these studies include
[10], [19], [40], [93], [22], [78], [75].
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on the survey data and one on the actual demand data - and I “map” these
models into one another using a scale parameter. In this way, I estimate a real
world demand model for Medicare Advantage plans that also incorporates the
effects of imperfect information, while the aspects that are not identified from
the real choice data are identified by the survey data.
Lastly, my study uses empirical tools from the learning Bayesian liter-
ature ([5], [26], [42], [27], [48]).
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Figure 1.1: Plan finder
25
Figure 1.2: Example of a timeline between healthcare delivery, data collection,
and star ratings release
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Domain Measure ID Measure Name Part C/D Weights MA - PD Weights
Staying Healthy
C01 Colorectal Cancer Screening 1 1
C02 Cardiovascular Care - Cholesterol Screening 1 1
C03 Diabetes Care - Cholesterol Screening 1 1
C04 Annual Flu Vaccine 1 1
C05 Improving or Maintaining Physical Health 3 3
C06 Improving or Maintaining Mental Health 3 3
C07 Monitoring Physical Activity 1 1
C08 Adult BMI Assessment 1 1
Managing
Chronic Conditions
C09 Special Needs Plan Care Management 1 1
C10 Care for Older Adults - Medication Review 1 1
C11 Care for Older Adults - Functional Status Assessment 1 1
C12 Care for Older Adults - Pain Assessment 1 1
C13 Osteoporosis Management in Women who had a Fracture 1 1
C14 Diabetes Care - Eye Exam 1 1
C15 Diabetes Care - Kidney Disease Monitoring 1 1
C16 Diabetes care - Blood Sugar Controlled 3 3
C17 Diabetes care - Cholesterol Controlled 3 3
C18 Controlling Blood Pressure 3 3
C19 Rheumatoid Arthritis Management 1 1
C20 Improving Bladder Control 1 1
C21 Reducing the Risk of Falling 1 1
C22 Plan All - Cause Readmissions 3 3
Member Experience
with the Health Plan
C23 Getting Needed Care 1.5 1.5
C24 Getting Appointments and Care Quickly 1.5 1.5
C25 Customer Service 1.5 1.5
C26 Rating of Health care Quality 1.5 1.5
C27 Rating of Health Plan 1.5 1.5
C28 Care Coordination 1.5 1.5
Member Complaints and
Changes in the Health
Plan’s Performance
C29 Complaints about the Health Plan 1.5 1.5
C30 Members Choosing to Leave the Plan 1.5 1.5
C31 Health Plan Quality Improvement 5 5
Health Plan
Customer Service
C32 Plan Makes Timely Decisions about Appeals 1.5 1.5
C33 Reviewing Appeals Decisions 1.5 1.5
Drug Plan
Customer Service
D01 Appeals Auto - Forward 1.5 1.5
D02 Appeals Upheld 1.5 1.5
Member Complaints and
Changes in the Health
Plan’s Performance
D03 Complaints about the Drug Plan 1.5 1.5
D04 Members Choosing to Leave the Plan 1.5 1.5
D05 Drug Plan Quality Improvement 5 5
Member Experience
with the Drug Plan
D06 Rating of Drug Plan 1.5 1.5
D07 Getting Needed Prescription Drugs 1.5 1.5
Drug Safety and
Accuracy of Drug Pricing
D08 MPF Price Accuracy 1 1
D09 High Risk Medication 3 3
D10 Diabetes Treatment 3 3
D11 Medication Adherence for Diabetes Medications 3 3
D12 Medication Adherence for Hypertension 3 3
D13 Medication Adherence for Cholesterol (Statins) 3 3
Table 1.1: Individual performance measures
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Star Ratings
Year ≤ 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
2008 – 2011 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
2012 – 2013 0% 3% 3.5% 4% 4% 5%
2014 0% 3% 3.5% 5% 5% 5%
2015 – present 0% 0% 0% 5% 5% 5%
Table 1.2: Quality bonus payment percentages by star rating levels
Star Ratings
Year ≤ 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
2008 – 2011 75% 75% 75% 75% 75% 75%
2012 66.7% 66.7% 71.7% 71.7% 73.3% 73.3%
2013 58.3% 58.3% 68.3% 68.3% 71.7% 71.7%
2014 – present 50.0% 50.0% 65.0% 65.0% 70.0% 70.0%




In this chapter I introduce and describe the data I use to investigate
the market and the policies of interest. The data come from publicly avail-
able data sources at the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).
Further, using standard discrete choice methods, I estimate demand for Medi-
care Advantage (MA) plans and provide evidence that star ratings do not
impact beneficiary plan choices. Lastly, I provide preliminary evidence that
the star ratings improvement observed in the market was mainly motivated by
the financial incentives insurers received through the Quality Bonus Program
(QBP).
2.1 Data
Every year CMS allows beneficiaries to compare characteristics of plans
that are available in their location through a Plan Finder website. I use the
Plan Finder database for the period 2008 – 2016 to compile information from
various data sets on star ratings, premiums, benefits, and enrollment levels.
I extract data on overall star ratings for every existing contract per
year. Figure 2.1 displays how the mean overall star ratings of all contracts
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has evolved over time. The market started experiencing an increase in star
ratings in 2011 in anticipation of the QBP. The average overall star rating first
exceeded 4 in 2015, the year when the QBP took its original and final form.
I also extract data sets on the premiums (Part B, C and D), the out-of-
pocket costs beneficiaries may incur in the plans in which they enroll, indica-
tors for drug, dental, vision, and hearing coverage, and indicators for Health
Maintenance Organization, Preferred Provider Organization, and Private Fee
For Service plan types for every plan and year. Moreover, I extract informa-
tion on plan enrollment and Medicare eligibility levels by state and county
and construct market shares for MA plans and Traditional Medicare (TM).
From the constructed data set, I drop plans that are sponsored by employ-
ers and those that are designed for individuals who are “dually eligible” for
Medicare and Medicaid. Plans in these categories operate under a different
payment and benefit structure. I also drop plan-county observations with ten
or fewer enrollees. CMS reports that these observations are created mostly by
individuals who move outside of the plan’s service area.
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics for each county-year-plan obser-
vation during the period 2008 – 2016. The total number of observations is
130607. There are 23743 county-years in total, each corresponding to a dif-
ferent market, 613 contracts, and 3890 plans across the nation. The average
number of contracts per market is 1.56, and the average number of plans per
market is 5.5. The average enrollment per plan is 378.3 with a high standard
deviation, implying that there is wide geographic variation in the number of
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potential enrollees. The average star rating per contract is 3.7, and most
contracts receive star ratings of 3.5 – 4.
Table 2.2 presents summary statistics on plan characteristics based on
different levels of star ratings.1 The data do not reveal any patterns between
plan benefits and star ratings. On average, a beneficiary pays $36 on Part
C premium, $31 on Part D premium, and $254 on out-of-pocket-cost for a
4-star plan. Higher-star plans are more expensive. This may contradict the
fact that star ratings do not capture financial aspects of quality. However, this
pattern can be attributed to the mechanics of the star ratings construction, as
people who report to being satisfied in the Consumer Assessment of Healthcare
Provider and Systems and the Healthcare Effectiveness Data Information Set
surveys can be enrolled in higher-premium plans.2
CMS does not provide data on the weighted average summary rates that
result in the discretized star ratings. Instead, it provides information on the
algorithms it uses to generate them as well as data on the star ratings for each
individual metric that composes the overall star rating of a contract.3 I extract
these data, and in combination with the algorithm information, I generate the
weighted average summary rates. Figure 2.2 shows how the average summary
rates I construct align with the star ratings for the year 2013. The horizontal
axis represents the average summary rates as I construct them, and the vertical
1Information on plans receiving less than “2.5 star” ratings is not reported because of
the limited availability of such plans in the data.
2Another explanation could be that insurers price star ratings.
3Section 1.1 of the appendix describes the main algorithm CMS uses.
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axis represents the star ratings reported in the original data set. As expected,
the shape of the plot resembles a step-wise function with jumps around the
thresholds where a new star rating is assigned. The overlaps are due to data
limitations that prevent perfect matching between the average summary rates
and the star ratings data.
2.2 Investigating the demand side
In this section I investigate the demand for health insurance plans to
quantify consumer willingness to pay for star ratings among other plan charac-
teristics. I use a fairly standard nested logit specification for plan demand that
has often been used in the literature ([91], [39], [29]) and I estimate demand
for MA plans. I assume that consumers are perfectly informed with regard to
the SRS and thus I treat star ratings as an additional plan characteristic.
I define a market as a county-year. Plans in every market are differ-
entiated with respect to premiums, star ratings, and benefit design. In every
market, consumer i makes a choice of a plan j, offered by insurer k, which
maximizes her utility based on all the observed plan characteristics among all
the available options. The nested logit specification will allow consumers to
have correlated tastes within the same group of products. I divide the existing
plans into two exhaustive and mutually exclusive groups, g: MA plans belong
to group g = 1, and TM, which represents the outside option, belongs to group
g = 0.
The utility beneficiary i receives from plan j in county m at time t is
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given by:
uikjmt = δkjmt + ζig(π) + (1− π)εikjmt, (2.1)
where
δkjmt = αpkjmt + βrkt + γxkjmt + ξk + ξkjmt. (2.2)
In this specification, pkjmt denotes the premium, rkt the star ratings, xkjmt
the plan characteristics that refer to the benefit design (drug, dental, vision,
and hearing coverage), and ξkjmt the unobserved to the econometrician plan
characteristics that usually refer to provider networks and plan advertising.
Finally, εikjmt is a zero-mean i.i.d. stochastic error term following the Type I
extreme-value distribution across plans and consumers, and ζig is another error
term drawn from a distribution with parameter π such that ζig(π)+(1−π)εikjmt
follows a generalized extreme value distribution.







where the utility a beneficiary receives from the outside good ui0mt has been
normalized to 0. Therefore, the final equation for estimation is
ln(skjmt)− ln(s0m) = δkjmt + πln(sg|i). (2.4)
Table 2.3 presents the estimates. Specifications (1) and (2) present OLS es-
timates with and without time fixed effects, respectively. Specifications (3)
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and (4) present IV estimates with and without time fixed effects, respectively.
All specifications include contract fixed effects to account for the fact that
there might be contract specific effects that are not captured by the charac-
teristics the current specifications control for. Consistent with OLS estimates
on the price being biased towards zero, the IV price coefficients are larger
in magnitude than the OLS coefficients. For this reason, I focus on the last
two specifications. All specifications of interest give a relatively low coefficient
on star ratings compared to other plan characteristics. The value consumers
assign to an extra star per month varies between $3 – $11.
Table 2.4 also presents specifications coming from a standard random
coefficient model that is estimated following the standard [14] algorithm. The
first three specifications present estimates without including instrumental vari-
ables. For the same reason as previously, I focus on the last specification that
includes instrumental variables. The estimates convey the same message. Con-
sumer willingness to pay for an extra star rating amounts to $1.
All demand estimates suggest that consumers tend to value drug cover-
age significantly more than every other plan characteristic. This result is not
new. It is fairly accepted in the health insurance literature that consumers
have high willingness to pay for drug coverage. However, it is worth to notice
that consumer willingness to pay for star ratings is close to, and in most cases
lower than, their average willingness to pay for plan characteristics such as
dental, vision, or hearing coverage. This observation arises concerns about the
reason why this might happen. Is it because the star ratings information does
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not get to consumers? Or, is it because star ratings are not very important to
consumers compared to other plan characteristics?
2.3 Investigating the supply side
In this section I investigate the supply side of the market analyzing how
the QBP affected the star ratings evolution.
The first observation was made at the beginning of the chapter based
on figure 2.1. The figure shows that the increase in the star ratings started
one year before the QBP was implemented. This observation suggests that
the QBP contributed to the star ratings improvement significantly more than
the information provision through the SRS did in the previous years.
Figure 2.3 displays the density distribution of the continuous quality
before and after the QBP. The graph indicates that after the QBP was imple-
mented the modes of the distribution are closer to the levels of quality where
the reimbursements would occur. Interestingly, we do not see bunching exactly
around the critical thresholds that should be achieved for different star rating
levels. This observation implies that even though insurers might target specific
quality levels, they cannot do so perfectly. If insurers were able to target the
quality levels they would like to achieve perfectly, we would see clear bunching
around the corresponding critical thresholds.
Investigating the evolution of the star ratings in more depth, figure 2.4
displays how the weighted-by-enrollment distribution of the average summary
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rates has evolved over time.4 The distributions are multi-modal, with the
modes around the thresholds where a new star rating is assigned. Interest-
ingly, after the implementation of the QBP in 2012 the highest modes of the
distributions are realized close to the thresholds where the plan reimburse-
ments occur. Those observations imply that insurers tend to target specific
ratings and that they are effectively motivated by the financial incentives.5
Noticeably, there are insurers who receive more than “4 star” ratings, which
might seem nonsensical since the bonuses are not higher for 5-star plans. This
observation reflects the fact that 5-star plans qualify for extra benefits com-
pared to lower-star plans; for example, they can enroll beneficiaries at any
time during the year.
Figure 2.5 displays kernel density estimates around the critical thresh-
olds that lead to the corresponding star rating levels for all years of data
together. A common pattern observed in most cases is a multi-modal distri-
bution with modes to the left and to the right of the critical thresholds. This
observation implies that knowing the star assignment algorithm used by CMS,
insurers try to ensure they will get to the necessary thresholds to achieve a
specific star rating level, but they cannot target perfectly. Interestingly, the
masses drop around the 3.75, 4.25 and 4.75 critical thresholds. If insurers did
not target specific levels of quality, we would expect smoother distributions
4I exclude plans that have entered and/or exited the market during the period of interest
to avoid concerns that entry/exit of plans affect the observed patterns.
5During 2012 – 2014, the modes of the distributions are almost equally spread around
the different thresholds, whereas after 2014, when the QBP program took its final form,
higher masses of the distributions are realized around the 4-star rating threshold.
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around the thresholds. Conversely, if insurers did target specific thresholds,
we would expect excess masses around the thresholds. It is interesting to no-
tice that uneven patterns are observed mostly around the thresholds leaning
to 3.5 and 4 star ratings suggesting that insurers try to target the levels that
will secure them the financial bonuses.
Further, I conduct [68] “manipulation” tests–widely used in the Re-
gression Discontinuity econometric literature–around critical thresholds. It is
important to mention that “manipulation” in this case does not imply “gam-
ing”. Instead, it simply describes a situation where insurers endogenously
make decisions on the quality levels they desire to achieve. The null hypothe-
sis of these tests is the one of “no manipulation”. All the tests were conducted
using the “rddensity” stata command. Figure 2.6 displays the results. Most
point estimates lie outside the confidence intervals suggesting that the tests
failed the null hypothesis of no manipulation.6
In addition, figures 2.7, 2.8, 2.9, 2.10, 2.11, 2.12 display results of [68]
tests around different thresholds for periods before and after the QBP was
implemented. Again the tests failed the null hypothesis of no manipulation in
almost all cases. It is interesting, however, to notice that around the critical
thresholds where insurers would be reimbursed with bonuses, the tests do not
fail the null hypothesis of no manipulation before the QBP was implemented,
but they fail it after.
6A test around the 2.25 critical threshold was not doable due to lack of sufficient obser-
vations around the threshold.
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2.4 Conclusions
Overall, the analysis of this chapter suggests that consumer willingness
to pay for star ratings is relatively low compared to other plan characteristics.
This observation can partially explain why the market does not experience star
ratings improvement during the first years that the SRS was implemented. If
consumers are not willing to pay for higher star ratings, then insurers do not
have any incentive to invest in them. In addition, the shift of the density
distribution of the continuous quality over time combined with the “no ma-
nipulation” tests results suggest that insurers were incentivized by the financial
incentives the QBP provided.
Before making definitive conclusions a few caveats should be taken into
account. First, low levels of demand responses to star ratings do not necessarily
mean that consumers do not value star ratings. Instead, this observation arises
the question of whether consumers are aware of the SRS and the information
it provides. In the available data consumers who are not aware of the SRS are
observationally equal to consumers who do not value star ratings. Importantly,
consumers who are not aware of the SRS might value the star ratings had they
been aware of it. Even more interestingly, they might have different levels of
willingness to pay for star ratings from consumers who are currently aware
of the SRS. Assuming perfect information can lead to demand estimates that
represent mixed values of two different consumer types. But, in a study that
analyzes the welfare effects of an information provision program, it is important
to distinguish different types of consumers with respect to their awareness
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levels and their willingness to pay so that the right policy implications to be
made.
Second, the current demand model treats star ratings as an additional
plan characteristic. However, star ratings represent (i.e. they are a signal
of) a specific dimension of quality that refers to customer satisfaction and
clinical outcomes. Concluding that consumers do not value star ratings can
lead to misleading interpretations in regards to whether consumers value star
ratings as signals of a specific dimension of quality or whether consumers
value this specific dimension of quality per se. Distinguishing between the two
is important for the right welfare analysis and policy recommendations.
Third, although the shift of the continuous quality distribution suggests
quality improvement due to the QBP, it is not clear whether this shift is
completely due to the financial incentives. Since the distributions are weighted
by enrollment, one could conclude that there is demand for higher-star plans
and thus demand side effects too. However, the high levels of inattention ([77],
[54]) that plague this market do not allow for a clear conclusion. And if the high
enrollment levels of the high-star plans do not reflect preferences, a question
that refers to the justification of the cost the market incurs to attain significant
quality improvement arises. Since distinguishing both the demand and supply
side effects of the two policies is important from a welfare perspective and
since clear conclusions cannot be made from the above analysis, building a
structural model is recommended.
The analysis of the next chapters shed light to the questions/concerns
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stated above. In the next chapter, I describe and analyze the results coming
from a survey I conduct. The goal of the survey is to identify the percent of
the MA beneficiaries that are not aware of the SRS and their corresponding
preferences given their type. After I conclude my survey analysis, I build and
estimate a full structural demand and supply equilibrium model that analyzes
the relative impacts of both policies, SRS and QBP, on welfare. Importantly,
on the demand side, I treat star ratings as signals of the quality dimension
that refers to clinical outcomes and customer satisfaction. In addition, on the
supply side, I model insurers to compete in two dimensions, price and star
ratings, incorporating a part of uncertainty in their decisions that does not let
them choose star ratings perfectly.
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Mean SD 25 % Median 75 %
Key plan variables
Monthly Part B premium ($) 100.501 8.622 96.4 101.007 104.9
Monthly Part C premium ($) 28.818 36.053 0 15.2 46.5
Monthly Part D premium ($) 22.861 20.826 0 22 34.8
Other plan characteristics
Overall star rating 3.705 0.609 3.5 3.5 4
Drug 0.760 0.426 1 1 1
Dental 0.330 0.470 0 0 1
Vision 0.813 0.389 1 1 1
Hear 0.667 0.471 0 1 1
Plan types
hmo 0.295 0.456 0 0 1
ppo 0.277 0.447 0 0 1
pffs 0.426 0.494 0 0 1
Plan-level enrollment 378.309 1477.609 29 72 231
Market-level MA share 0.197 0.127 0.097 0.172 0.269
Total # of markets 23743
Total # of contracts 613
Total # of plans 3890
# of contracts/ market 1.560 0.859 1 1 2
# of plans/ market 5.500 4.819 2 4 7
# of plans/ contract 1.642 0.906 1 1 2
Monthly payment ($) 800.315 141.901 699.435 781.361 884.233
N = 130607
Table 2.1: Summary statistics
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Star Ratings
Variable 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
Part C premium ($/month) 16.094 18.832 32.794 36.442 44.981 68.849
Part D premium ($/month) 14.252 17.603 27.440 31.161 32.021 34.345
OOPC ($/month) 221.807 211.391 233.032 253.633 228.673 220.029
Supplemental Coverage
Prescription drugs .757 .818 .860 .824 .839 .683
Dental .412 .271 .284 .351 .482 .106
Vision .911 .814 .845 .875 .884 .953
Hearing .761 .607 .492 .432 .626 .858
Plan types
HMO .280 .254 .312 .305 .522 1.000
PPO .165 .365 .483 .438 .477 0.000
PFFS .553 .379 .203 .256 .000 .000
Market shares .036 .048 .054 .052 .061 .048
Observations 3486 11345 17663 14800 12724 1104
Table 2.2: Plan characteristics by star ratings
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Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
α -.001*** -.001*** -.023*** -.026***
(.000) (.000) (.001) (.001)
β -.023*** .104*** .062*** .302***
(.009) (.009) (.018) (.016)
γdrug .201*** .183*** 1.292*** 1.451***
(.008) (.008) (.046) (.041)
γvision .069*** .084*** .209*** .238***
(.010) (.010) (.019) (.017)
γdental .073*** .090*** .549*** .670***
(.007) (.007) (.024) (.021)
γhear .010 -.021* .605*** .660***
(.010) (.012) (.033) (.029)
ln(plan MA share) .817*** .826*** .684*** .676***
(.002) (.002) (.007) (.006)
Willingness to pay (in$/month) for:
an extra star -23 104 3 11
drug covg 201 183 56 56
vision covg 69 84 9 9
dental covg 73 90 24 25
hear covg 10 -21 26 25
Mean of dependent variable -1.882*** -2.104*** -2.894*** -3.546***
(.036) (.035) (.071) (.083)
Mean own-price elasticity -.369 -.318 -4.344 -4.838
Year FEs Y N Y N
Contract FEs Y Y Y Y
IVs N N Y Y
Observations 61146 61146 61146 61146
Adj. R2 .753 .743 .752 .743
Table 2.3: Demand estimates - Nested Logit
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Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
α -.005 -.007 -.008 -.055
β .146 .279 -.050 .060
σα .0007 .007 0.006 .044
σβ .002 .016 .002 .011
γdrug 1.268 1.144 1.318 1.877
γvision .108 -.610 .0715 .215
γdental .140 .007 .119 .420
γhear -.014 -.048 .070 .270
Willingness to pay (in$/ month) for:
an extra star 29.2 39.8 -6.2 1.0
drug covg 253.6 163.4 164.8 34.1
vision covg 21.6 -76.2 8.8 3.9
dental covg 28.0 1.0 14.8 7.6
hear covg -2.8 -6.8 8.7 4.9
Mean of dependent variable -4.605 - 19.729 -3.113 21.625
Mean own-price elasticity -.663 -1.276 -1.131 -9.578
Year FEs N Y Y Y
Contract FEs N N Y Y
IVs N N N Y
Observations 61146 61146 61146 61146
Table 2.4: Demand estimates - Random Coefficients
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Figure 2.1: Average star ratings evolution over time
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Figure 2.2: Constructed average summary rates
46
Figure 2.3: Density distribution of continuous quality before and after QBP
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In this chapter, I describe and analyze an electronic survey I designed
and ran targeting the Medicare Advantage (MA) population. The survey
yields unique information on consumer awareness with respect to the Star
Rating System (SRS). Within the survey, I also conduct a conjoint analysis to
elicit consumer preferences for star ratings. In this way I recover consumers’
willingness to pay for star ratings given their awareness status, and also ob-
tain clear explanations of the reasons that prevent star ratings from affecting
demand for MA plans. Lastly, through an additional set of questions, I inves-
tigate what are the most important factors that affect consumer plan choice
decisions.
3.1 New Survey Data on Medicare Population
The survey was executed by Qualtrics, which is a privately held ex-
perience management company that provides a survey platform/software for
collecting and analyzing data for market research, customer satisfaction, loy-
alty, etc. Qualtrics has 6m members in N. America. It recruits respondents
by providing them an incentive, the strength of which depends on the survey
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length and the target-level acquisition difficulty.
As the population of interest was MA beneficiaries, I stratified the sam-
ple by oversampling the MA population. The survey was distributed to 624
nationally representative respondents (456 MA and 168 Traditional Medicare
(TM) beneficiaries) in two roll-outs; one in August 2019 and another in Jan-
uary 2020. The purpose of the two roll-outs was twofold. First, the initial
roll-out served the purpose of a soft launch that could reveal potential prob-
lems; no substantial problems arose, and therefore no major changes were
made in the second roll-out. Second, rolling out the survey in two different
periods allowed me to compare the SRS awareness levels in periods closer and
further away from the annual enrollment period.1
Respondents gained access to the survey by invitation only. The survey
consisted of five sets of questions.2 In the first set of questions recruits went
through a layer of validation (mainly MA age eligibility) to ensure that they
represented the target population. In the second set of questions I investigated
consumer awareness with respect to the SRS. In the third set of questions I
conducted the conjoint experiments to estimate the respondents’ preferences
with respect to star ratings. In the fourth set of questions I investigated the
general process consumers follow before they make their insurance plan choice.
Finally, in the fifth set of questions I collected demographic information of the
1In the following sections I show that there were not major differences in the results
between the two periods.
2For the full questionnaire of the survey see section 2.2 of the appendix.
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respondents.
After the data collection, I conducted a series of tests to ensure that
there would not be gibberish responses in the final data. First, I excluded re-
spondents whose IP address was not in the U.S. Second, I excluded respondents
who did not spend sufficient time on the survey.3 Finally, I excluded respon-
dents who gave “meaningless” answers to “open-ended” questions.4 Overall,
I ended up with a total of 618 respondents. Out of this sample, none of the
respondents dropped out during the survey.
Table 3.1 shows the length of the total duration of the survey in min-
utes as well as the time (in seconds) respondents spent on specific questions.
Respondents spent 9.18 minutes on average to answer the entire survey. The
main filtering question took them on average 36 seconds, while the question
referring to their SRS awareness took them 17.5 seconds. They spent an av-
erage of 19 seconds on the first question of the conjoint experiment and an
average of 7.5 seconds on the last one. This implies that, after the first con-
joint experiment question, respondents became familiar with the concept of
the experiment. Lastly, they spent almost a minute on the set of demograph-
ics questions. Table 3.2 also shows the corresponding durations split by the
two roll-outs of the survey. The main difference in the results is the average
3Specifically, I excluded respondents who spent less than a percentile of the duration of
the full survey or of the question referring to the coverage they had (TM vs MA).
4“Meaningless” responses were those that did not make sense or were unintelligible.
Responses that were expressing any kind of emotions about Medicare or the survey itself
were not excluded from the sample.
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time respondents spent to answer the survey. In the second round of the sur-
vey respondents spent on average one min lower compared to the first. This
difference reflects an additional set of questions included in the first round of
the survey that required respondents more time to think. In the second round
I excluded this set, because it did not provide meaningful results.
3.1.1 Filtering respondents
In this section, I describe the first set of questions respondents had
to answer to ensure that the sample represented the target population. I
constructed a set of criterion-questions that respondents had to answer before
moving to the main part of the survey. Respondents who did not satisfy the
necessary criteria were dropped from the sample.
The first eligibility criterion was age. Respondents below the age of
65 were excluded from the sample. Respondents were also asked to report
the state of their current residence to ensure that the sample was nationally
representative. Figure 3.1 shows the geographic variation of the survey popu-
lation. The figure suggests that the sample is nationally representative. States
in which there were not responses were Delaware and Wyoming. Also, respon-
dents that reported they lived in Alaska were excluded from the sample, as this
group of the population is also excluded from the sample of my main analysis.
Further, respondents had to report the main source–TM or MA–of
their health insurance coverage. Respondents were provided example insur-
ance cards explaining the main differences between TM and MA and they
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had to choose the option that applied to them. A third option, “Other”, was
also included to account for the remaining cases. Figure 3.2 shows the exact
question they received. Respondents who chose “Other” were excluded from
the sample. Further, respondents who reported they received coverage from
their current or previous employers and/or from Veterans’ programs were ex-
cluded from the survey, as these beneficiaries face different sets of plan options
and benefits. Disabled population should also be excluded from the sample.
However, the addition of a question investigating “disability” status would
complicate the screening process due to the institutional complications of the
industry and the properties that qualify a beneficiary to be classified as “dis-
abled”.5 Overall, almost 50% of the respondents who satisfied the criteria of
age and main eligibility did not satisfy the rest of the criteria (mainly due
to their “employer-sponsored” insurance coverage) and were dropped. After
respondents were filtered, they received access to the main part of the survey,
where they had to answer a series of questions related to their SRS awareness
and their preferences for star ratings. A set of a few extra questions, necessary
for robustness analysis, followed.
3.1.2 Collecting demographic information
Collection of demographic information was necessary to ensure that
the sample represented well the Medicare population. I asked respondents
5An additional reason to exclude such a question was also the possibility that it could
affect respondents’ answers and would question the validity of the survey.
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to report their gender, ethnicity, marital status, monthly spending, education
level and health status providing them various options. The options I provided
were similar to the options provided by the Medicare Current Beneficiary
Survey (MCBS), which is a rotating panel survey that tracks representative
Medicare beneficiaries on an annual basis.6 Lastly, I asked respondents the
zip-code of their current residence.
Table 3.3 compares demographic information between my survey’s sam-
ple population and MCBS’s sample population, both split by MA and TM en-
rollment. The population is slightly younger in my sample than in the MCBS
sample. My sample does not have considerable Black and/or Hispanic repre-
sentation in either the MA or the TM populations compared to the MCBS
sample. The education attainment is similar between the two populations. In
my survey, I did not include the option “college attainment” in the “education-
related” question, and thus the “college attainment” variable is subsumed in
the “bachelor degree” variable. Respondents in my survey reported that they
are slightly healthier compared to what MCBS respondents report. Lastly,
“spending” refers to the beneficiaries’ annual spending on housing, utility bills,
food, transportation, healthcare, and other common leisure activities. On av-
erage, “spending” is lower for the MA population. Such a variable does not
exist in the MCBS data. Instead, there is information on the annual income
6MCBS provides information on beneficiaries’ annual enrollment decisions and their rel-
evant demographic information. Although I do not use this data set in my analysis, I use
this information to show the main differences between my survey population and the bigger
MCBS population.
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of Medicare beneficiaries. Overall, such differences are not surprising since
the techniques and methodologies followed for the data collection are different
between MCBS and Qualtrics.
Table 3.4 presents demographic information of the survey sample as it
arose in the two roll-outs separately. Overall, the samples seem to be similar
between the two roll-outs. The main difference is with respect to age. Bene-
ficiaries in the first roll-out are on average 71-72 years old, while beneficiaries
in the second roll-out are on average 67 years old. This difference is due to the
fact that in the second round of the survey, Qualtrics was able to target MA
population that was specifically between 65-70 years old.7 Concerns about the
sample not being representative should not arise, since if younger beneficiaries
are not aware of the SRS, we would not expect older beneficiaries to be more
aware.
3.1.3 Eliciting information on Information
To elicit information on the level of consumer awareness with respect
to the SRS, after I briefly described to respondents the SRS and its scope I
directly asked them whether they knew anything about it. To ensure that
the information I provided about the SRS on this question would not affect
respondents’ answers, I followed the exact description of the SRS PlanFinder
website gives actual consumers. Figure 3.3 displays the exact question as it
7Beneficiaries in this age group had a higher chance to be first time enrollees. As first
time enrollees are considered being “active” choosers, focusing on them can provide better
demand estimates.
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appeared in the survey.
Table 3.5 presents the results. Overall, 77.4% of the entire Medicare
population reported they were unaware of the SRS.8 Comparing the aware-
ness levels between the TM and MA populations, 17.3% and 32.1% reported
that they were aware of the SRS, respectively. This difference reflects that
MA beneficiaries tend to be more informed about the MA market. Overall,
the results indicate that, regardless of the efforts and the sources the govern-
ment allocates in the collection of the necessary information as well as the
construction and the release of the star ratings, consumers are not aware of
them.
Table 3.6 also shows how the results differ between the two roll-outs
of the survey. It turns out that consumers are more aware in the second roll-
out than in the first one, which reflects the fact that immediately after the
enrollment period had ended consumers were more informed. An additional
factor that could have affected this outcome is the younger sample of the
second roll-out. However, the results do not differ much in magnitude, and
the patterns of awareness are very similar between the roll-outs, with most of
the population reporting to be unaware of the SRS.
Table 3.7 displays how awareness varies between the TM and MA pop-
8This result almost coincides with the result from another survey conducted by Health-
Mine in August 2018, indicating that 78% of the Medicare population was unfamiliar with




ulations given their demographics. Both types–aware and unaware–seem to
be similar. Respondents who reported they were unaware of the SRS were
slightly older, slightly less educated, and less healthy. Also more females re-
ported to be unaware. The data set does not provide enough variation to
compare the populations with respect to race and ethnicity. Lastly, tables 3.8
and 3.9 display the same information between populations in the two roll-outs
separately. No major differences are observed between the groups.
3.1.4 Information on Preferences–Conjoint Analysis
To elicit information on preferences for star ratings, rkmt, after I sep-
arately identified the aware from the unaware consumer types I conducted a
conjoint analysis following [11]. Conjoint analyses have been widely used in
marketing research to measure consumer preferences and to forecast demand
for components of a prospective product or service. The idea behind a conjoint
analysis is that respondents are invited to make a series of choices requiring a
trade-off between hypothetical product options.
The experiment was executed as follows. First, I provided all consumer
types–ex ante aware and unaware–with a message to remind them what the
SRS and its scope were and to give them information on the distribution of the
star ratings. In this way, I ensured that everyone understood the signaling role
the star ratings played and also realized the average level of star rating a plan
gets. Figure 3.4 displays the exact message respondents received. Second, as-
suming that consumers prefer lower prices and higher star ratings, I generated
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a number of menus (choice sets) that randomly presented a trade-off between
prices and star ratings. In reality, consumers face a rich set of options with
each option characterized by many plan characteristics. However, to keep the
experiment tractable and the length of the survey short, I gave respondents a
simplified version of choice sets with only two options and two characteristics–
prices and star ratings–for each option. Each respondent was provided with a
set of 4 or 8 different menus, having to choose their preferred option for each
menu. Figure 3.5 shows an example question for a menu respondents were
presented. Table 3.10 shows all the possible values of the attributes presented
in the experiments.
Figure 3.6 further displays the price and star differences that were pre-
sented in each menu provided to survey respondents. More specifically, a point
in the graph represents the difference of the star ratings between the options
that were available in a menu along with the corresponding difference of the
prices between those two options.9 Lastly, figures 3.7 and 3.8 display the price
and star ratings variation in the menus that were provided to the respondents,
respectively. All figures provide evidence that there was significant price and
star rating variation in the menus of the conjoint experiments.
A concern that might arise regarding the experiment is the trade-off
between the realism of the options and the ability of respondents to report their
preferences in a short time. If the characteristics provided are too numerous
9For example, point (1,40) represents a menu where the difference in the star ratings of
the two available options was 1 and the price difference between these two options was $40.
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(generally more than 6 in a given choice) respondents tend to choose the ones
that look simpler and more important to them without paying attention to
the rest. In my conjoint analysis there are not such concerns, since I included
only two attributes for each choice I provided to respondents.
3.1.4.1 Estimating preferences
A natural approach used in conjoint analyses is to treat the choice data
that arise from the experiments like observed market choice data. In what
follows, I present a discrete choice model that describes respondents’ (stated)
preferences for prices and star ratings. Each respondent i = 1, ..., N receives
a set of m = 1, ...,M menus, each offering j = 1, ..., Jm alternatives.
10 Each
option j per menu m is characterized by two plan characteristics: prices, pjm,
and star ratings, rjm. The utility a respondent i receives from an option j in
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where φs is the probability that the respondent cares for star ratings. Lastly,
I assume that εsijm follows the Type I Extreme Value distribution. With this
set of assumptions, the choice probability of a respondent i choosing plan j in
menu m is given by:
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s, φs) are the parameters to be esti-
mated.
Define vector dn ≡ (d1, .., dm, .., dM) to be the portfolio of choices for
respondent i, where dm ≡ (d1m, .., djm, ..., dJm) is a vector that shows which
plan j in menu m was chosen by the respondent, with
djm =
{
1 if i chooses j in menu m
0 o/w
. (3.4)
Then, the probability that respondent i chooses portfolio d = (d1, ..., dm, ..., dM)
is given by:
P sid(d|r, p; θs) =∑
φsi∈{0,1}











Pijm(pjm, rjm|Φsi = φsi ; θs)djmdF (αsi , βsi ),
(3.5)
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where r ≡ (r1, .., rm, .., rM); rm = (r1m, .., rjm, .., rJm), and p ≡ (p1, .., pm, .., pM);
pm = (p1m, ..., pJm).
By providing respondents a set of M = {4, 8} menus to choose a plan
per menu, I generated a panel of choices per respondent that contributed to the
identification of the groups that do not care about star ratings. Specifically,
the percent of these groups was identified by the proportion of respondents
who always chose the cheapest option across all the different menus they were
presented. Identification of the rest of the coefficients was accomplished as in
standard random coefficient models. An advantage of this experimental design
is the random assignment of the different menus to different respondents, the
random assignment of plan attributes to different menus, and the assumption
that the two options in every menu were identical in every other dimension.
The combination of those aspects secure the orthogonality conditions needed
for identification of the parameters without requiring additional instrumental
variables.
To estimate the parameters of interest, I used the Simulated Maximum
Likelihood method. I estimated the parameters for both ex ante aware and
unaware respondents. Table 3.11 presents the results from the two different
specifications. Specification (1) assumes that respondents who do not care
about star ratings have the same price preferences as those who somewhat care
about star ratings, i.e., αsi,nc = α
s




Specification (2) assumes that price preferences between caring and non-caring
respondents follow different distributions, but there is no correlation between
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the price and star rating random coefficients. The assumptions in these two
specifications are reasonable and also reduce the number of parameters to be
estimated given the number of observations in the survey. Estimation of all
the parameters would require a much higher number of observations, which
was beyond the scope of the study.
All estimates in specification (1) are statistically significant. The value
of φs indicates that the proportion of respondents who care about star rat-
ings is higher for the aware types in comparison to the unaware. Moreover,
conditional on caring, the aware types place a value on an extra star rating
of $30.11 per month, while the unaware types place a value on an extra star
rating of $27.54 per month. Overall, the aware types value an extra star rating
$25.23 per month, while the unaware types value an extra star rating $20.66
per month. This difference is not surprising since aware consumers tend to be
more conscious when they make their choices as compared to unaware con-
sumers. The estimates of specification (2) are close to those of specification
(1). They are mostly statistically significant, with the exception of αncs and
σsα,nc for the aware types.
I will use the estimates from the first specification for further analysis,
as they are fairly robust and also statistically significant. Overall, the results
imply that consumers are willing to pay $25 per month for a marginal increase
in star ratings. The amount Medicare pays via the Quality Bonus Program to
incentivize firms to increase star ratings is $30 per month per plan on average.
This observation further indicates that the estimates are reasonable.
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Table 3.12 presents the results across these two specifications for the
two roll-outs of the survey separately. Although the estimates might seem
slightly different in magnitude, the overall value for star ratings are similar for
all consumer types and all specifications between the two roll-outs.
Table 3.13 presents results across two more specifications: one in which
I estimate all the parameters of the model without making any restrictions
and one in which I assume that consumers who care about star ratings have
different price preferences from those who do not care and also that price
preferences of consumers who do not care about star ratings are homogenous.
Overall, the results are similar to the results of the first two specifications.
Although the model can be as flexible as the one of specification (3), such
a specification requires a higher number of survey respondents, as currently
some of the extra parameters cannot be estimated precisely. Table 3.14 also
presents the results across these two specifications for the two roll-outs of the
survey separately.
Lastly, tables 3.15, 3.16, 3.17, 3.18 present results of the main specifica-
tions of interest ((1) and (2)) assuming that demographic characteristics, age,
health, income, and education, respectively, affect consumer preferences. Not
particular patterns and/or particular conclusions can be made based on these
results, as many of the additional variables tend to be statistically insignifi-
cant. For more precise estimates that can lead to better conclusions there is
need for an additional round of surveys with a higher number of respondents
overall.
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Overall, the results across all different specifications suggest that con-
sumer willingness to pay for star ratings amounts to $20 – $25 on average
depending on their type. This result combined with the results of the previous
chapter indicate that under the assumption of perfect information consumer
willingness to pay for star ratings would be underestimated and would lead
to biased welfare predictions. Further, it is worth to notice that the survey
demand estimates predict that consumers are willing to pay on average 50%
– 85% more than the logit demand estimates of the previous chapter predict.
This observation support the validity of the survey as this level is close to the
proportion of consumers who are unaware of the SRS.
3.1.5 Investigating the general process of a choice decision
In the last part of the survey, I include a set of questions that investigate
the general process Medicare beneficiaries follow when they make their annual
plan enrollment decision. First, I ask respondents whether they receive any
help when they choose plans. In case they do, I further investigate what sources
they use to receive help and also what kind of help they receive. Tables 3.19,
3.20, and 3.21 present the results. Overall, 20% of the Medicare population
receive help when choosing a plan. It is interesting to notice that this level
does not change depending on consumers’ SRS awareness status. Among the
beneficiaries who receive help, it seems that the most common source they
use is either a family member or an independent agent who usually suggest or
choose a plan for them.
69
Second, I ask respondents to rate the importance they place on differ-
ent plan characteristics–premium, copay/ coinsurance, networks, star ratings,
drug coverage, extra benefits (dental, vision, hearing)–on a 5-point scale–
Not important, Slightly important, Moderately important, Important,Very
important–when they make their annual plan enrollment decision. Figure
3.9 shows the question as it appeared to respondents and table 3.22 presents
the results. The results indicate that the most important characteristic for
consumers are networks and drug prescription coverage. Premiums and co-
pays/coinsurance rates follow, while rest benefits (dental, vision, hearing) and
star ratings are the least important for them. Importantly, although prefer-
ences for the different plan characteristics do not differ between aware and
unaware consumers, they do differ with respect to star ratings. This observa-
tion validates the conjoint experiment results that suggest that the different
consumer types have different levels of willingness to pay for star ratings.
Third, I ask respondents an open-ended question where I encourage
them to report any additional factor they take into consideration before they
make their annual enrollment decision.11 The last question of this part of the
survey asks respondents to report their satisfaction level with respect to MA
and/or TM on a scale from 1-100. Table 3.23 presents the results. Overall,
consumers tend to be slightly more satisfied with MA compared to TM, while
the levels they report do not change regarding their SRS awareness status.
11See section 2.3 of the appendix for respondents’ answers.
70
3.2 Conclusions
This chapter describes the survey I conducted to elicit information on
the proportion of the Medicare population that was aware of the SRS and elicit
consumer preferences for star ratings. In the survey, I also recover further
information on the ways consumers choose plans and on the most important
factors that affect their annual enrollment decisions.
The results indicated that a high percent of the population is unaware
of the SRS implying that the information provision policy is neither informing
consumers nor is it providing an incentive mechanism for competition in quality
on the supply side. The results coming from the conjoint experiments suggest
that had consumers been aware of the SRS, they would value star ratings, but
not at the same level as the consumers who are already aware. This is not
surprising; consumers who are more aware of any kind of information tend to
be more conscious when they make their purchase decisions.
Using conjoint experiments to identify consumer preferences is a novel
part of this study as it provides unique estimates for a group of people re-
searchers do not have information on. The exogenous variation of prices and
star ratings further supports demand estimates that are not contaminated by
endogeneity issues that are prevalent when using real choice data.
A caveat of the conjoint analysis, however, is that the recovered random
coefficient for star ratings is a composite of consumer preferences for star
ratings and consumer value for the information the star ratings provide. Hence,
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I cannot separately identify the value consumers have for the information the
SRS provides with respect to clinical outcomes and customer service from the
exact preferences consumers have for the this specific dimension of quality per
se. A potential solution to this problem is building a Bayesian learning discrete
choice model that would exploit respondents’ prior and posterior beliefs on
star ratings. Building and estimating such a model potentially requires an
additional round of surveys that would generate variation in respondents’ prior
beliefs with respect to the SRS. This task is left for future research.
Lastly, the survey provides evidence that although consumers value star
ratings, they tend to value other plan characteristics more. Having insurance
plans that provide their preferred provider networks along with drug coverage
seems to be the characteristics for which consumers would be willing to pay
the the most.
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Mean Median Std. Dev.
Total duration (in min) 9.186 7.800 8.198
Specific questions (in sec)
Filtering 36.077 29.474 28.598
Awareness 17.525 14.138 16.423
HCE 1st 18.677 15.754 15.702
HCE 4th 7.928 6.433 6.000
HCE 8th 7.434 5.507 8.008
Demographics 53.900 47.303 27.004
Table 3.1: Survey duration
1st roll-out 2nd roll-out
Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev.
Total duration (in min) 9.693 8.216 9.624 8.135 7.250 4.127
Specific questions (in sec)
Filtering 36.412 30.782 28.778 35.382 27.553 28.281
Awareness 16.784 13.864 12.227 19.063 15.102 22.748
HCE 1st 18.848 15.799 17.507 18.321 15.732 11.089
HCE 4th 7.814 6.412 5.352 8.163 6.552 7.168
HCE 8th - - - 7.434 5.507 8.008
Demographics 54.790 48.734 26.819 52.054 44.049 27.358
Table 3.2: Survey duration split by roll-outs
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Survey MCBS
Variable MA TM MA TM
MA enrollment indicator 1 0 1 0
Demographics
Spending ($) 24758 26074
Income ($) 32484 34239
Age 70.372 70.376 73.13 72.3
Female .480 .543 .561 554
Black .028 .037 .087 .075
Hispanic .006 0 .027 .014
Education
High School .298 .345 .341 .343
Bachelor degree .337 .358 .148 .166
Attended college .211 .199
Graduate degree .201 .166
Health Status
Excellent .092 .123 .162 .155
Very good .432 .314 .297 .274
Good .353 .370 .309 .305
Fair .116 .166 .176 .180
Poor .006 .018 .054 .082
Observations 456 162 17620 35647
Table 3.3: Demographics of the survey population
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1st roll-out 2nd roll-out
Variable MA TM MA TM
MA enrollment indicator 1 0 1 0
Demographics
Spending ($) 25970 28529 22203 21560
Age 71.757 71.962 67.462 67.375
Female .482 .509 .476 .607
Black .012 .028 .061 .053
Hispanic .006 0 .006 0
Education
High School .304 .339 .285 .357
Bachelor degree .317 .349 .380 .375
Graduate degree .216 .188 .170 .125
Health Status
Excellent .097 .132 .081 .107
Very good .475 .339 .340 .267
Good .310 .386 .442 .339
Fair .113 .113 .122 .267
Poor .003 .018 .013 .017
Observations 309 106 147 56
Table 3.4: Demographics of the survey population split by roll-outs
Consumer types Aware Unaware
Population
Traditional Medicare 0.173 0.827
Medicare Advantage 0.321 0.679
Overall 0.226 0.774
Table 3.5: Aware/Unaware consumer types
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1st roll-out 2nd roll-out
Consumer types Aware Unaware Aware Unaware
Population
Traditional Medicare 0.140 0.860 0.250 0.750
Medicare Advantage 0.322 0.678 0.327 0.673
Overall 0.180 0.820 0.220 0.780
Table 3.6: Awareness levels in the different roll-outs
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Medicare Advantage Traditional Medicare
Variable Aware Unaware Aware Unaware
Demographics
Age 70.212 70.448 68.96 70.67
Female .397 .519 .500 .552
Black .027 .029 0 .044
Hispanic .006 .006 0 0
Education
High School .246 .322 .285 .358
Bachelor’s degree .390 .312 .357 .358
Graduate degree .226 .190 .250 .149
Health Status
Excellent .102 .087 .250 .097
Very good .431 .432 .357 .305
Good .342 .358 .250 .395
Fair .109 .119 .142 .171
Poor .013 .003 0 .022
Plan Characteristics
Monthly premium 59.810 84.662
Star rating 4.489
Observations 146 310 28 134
Table 3.7: Awareness by MA/TM
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Medicare Advantage Traditional Medicare
Variable Aware Unaware Aware Unaware
Demographics
Age 71.591 71.834 70.000 72.260
Female .448 .497 .357 .532
Black .030 .004 .000 .032
Hispanic .000 .009 .000 .000
Education
High School .244 .331 .214 .358
Bachelor’s degree .397 .279 .357 .347
Graduate degree .193 .227 .357 .163
Health Status
Excellent .132 .080 .357 .097
Very good .479 .473 .357 .336
Good .306 .312 .214 .413
Fair .081 .127 .071 .119
Poor .000 .004 .000 .021
Plan Characteristics
Monthly premium 61.765 90.734
Star rating 4.483
Observations 98 211 14 92
Table 3.8: Awareness by MA/TM - 1st roll-out
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Medicare Advantage Traditional Medicare
Variable Aware Unaware Aware Unaware
Demographics
Age 67.395 67.494 67.928 67.190
Female .291 .565 .642 .595
Black .020 .080 .000 .071
Hispanic .020 .000 .000 .000
Education
High School .250 .303 .357 .357
Bachelor’s degree .375 .383 .357 .380
Graduate degree .291 .111 .142 .119
Health Status
Excellent .041 .101 .142 .095
Very good .333 .343 .357 .238
Good .416 .454 .285 .357
Fair .166 .101 .214 .285
Poor .041 .000 .000 .023
Plan Characteristics
Monthly premium 55.900 71.270
Star rating 4.500
Observations 48 99 14 42
Table 3.9: Awareness by MA/TM - 2nd roll-out
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Attribute Levels
Prices 0, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18,
19, 20, 21, 22, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30,
31, 32, 33, 37, 39, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46,
49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 56, 57, 60, 61,
62, 63, 64, 66, 67, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73,
75, 78, 80, 81, 82, 87, 88, 89, 99, 101
Star ratings 2, 2.5, 3, 3.5, 4, 4.5, 5
Table 3.10: Attributes for conjoint experiments
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(1) (2)
Consumer types Aware Unaware Aware Unaware
Variable
αsc -.099 -.120 -.085 -.104
(.014) (.010) (.013) (.009)
σsα,c .064 .064 .046 .052
(.013) (.009) (.009) (.007)
β
s
2.992 3.324 2.563 2.840
(.414) (.277) (.363) (.236)
σsβ 1.537 1.397 1.353 .958
(.835) (.558) (.422) (.283)
ρs .012 .007
(.029) (.017)
φs .837 .750 .880 .771
(.117) (.064) (.091) (.043)
αsnc -.100 -.121 -.368 -.334
(.059) (.033) (.550) (.164)
σsα,nc .064 .064 .205 .207
(.066) (.036) (.404) (.112)




i,c|βsi,c = 0, ρ 6= 0 Y Y N N
αsi,nc 6= αsi,c|βsi,c = 0, ρ = 0 N N Y Y
Monthly star value for caring types $30.114 $27.547 $30.157 $27.221
Overall monthly star value $25.232 $20.665 $26.547 $21.012


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Consumer types Aware Unaware Aware Unaware
Variable
αsc -.083 -.114 -.077 .093





2.487 2.824 2.433 2.383
(.372) (.267) (.321) (.230)
σsβ 1.224 1.366 1.700 2.006
(.460) (.471) (.327) (.220)
ρs .017 .001
(.019) (.019)
φs .875 .783 .887 .898
(.091) (.055) (.074) (.045)
αsnc -.461 -.624 -.203 -.451
(1.023) (.550) (.167) (.462)
σsα,nc .404 .764
(.891) (.685)
Observations 177 447 177 447
Assumptions
αsi,c 6= αsi,nc, ρ 6= 0 Y Y N N
σα,{c,nc} = 0, α
s
c 6= αsnc, ρ = 0 N N Y Y
Monthly star value given Φi = 1 $29.724 $24.765 $31.477 $25.575
Overall monthly star value $26.010 $19.400 $27.936 $22.967




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Consumer types Aware Unaware Aware Unaware
Variable
αsc,old -.122 -.111 -.103 -.143
(.074) (.025) (.155) (.050)
αsc,young .030 .004 .018 .039
(.079) (.020) (.156) (.050)
αsc,middle .026 .006 .015 .043
(.083) (.027) (.157) (.053)
σsα,c,old .061 .040 .047 .052
(.014) (.009) (.010) (.007)
β
s
old 2.816 1.837 1.335 2.915
(2.310) (1.478) (.432) (1.265)
β
s
young .016 .007 -.019 -.079
(2.610) (1.459) (4.733) (1.278)
β
s
middle -.043 .012 .103 -.031
(2.709) (1.539) (4.773) (1.374)
σsβold 1.450 2.210 1.335 .912
(.790) (.246) (.432) (.284)
ρs .010 .009
(.027) (.010)
φs .855 .980 .880 .768
(.136) (.064) (.091) (.042)
αsnc -.123 -.111 -.365 -.329
(.223) (.148) (.537) (.157)
σsα,nc .061 .039 .203 .205
(.072) (.031) (.392) (.107)




i,c|βsi,c = 0, ρ 6= 0 Y Y N N
αsi,nc 6= αsi,c|βsi,c = 0, ρ = 0 N N Y Y
Monthly star value for caring types - young 30.814 17.147 30.321 27.101
Overall monthly star value - young 26.355 16.804 26.690 20.839
Monthly star value for caring types - middle 28.697 17.537 30.538 28.703
Overall monthly star value - middle 24.544 17.186 26.881 22.071
Monthly star value for caring types - old 22.952 16.435 24.967 20.283
Overall monthly star value - old 19.631 16.399 21.977 15.596
Table 3.15: Conjoint experiment estimates - Demographics: age
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(1) (2)
Consumer types Aware Unaware Aware Unaware
Variable
αsc,poor -.065 -.112 -.026 -.134
(.053) (.034) (.779) (.091)
αsc,excellent -.057 .009 -.086 .033
(.082) (.037) (.779) (.094)
αsc,verygood -.059 -.001 -.048 .027
(.073) (.032) (.780) (.091)
αsc,good -.038 .015 -.067 .034
(.072) (.028) (.780) (.091)
αsc,fair -.040 -.007 -.062 .016
(.085) (.034) (.779) (.093)
σsα,c,poor .077 .038 .051 .052
(.014) (.009) (.011) (.007)
β
s
poor 2.958 1.815 2.459 2.894
(2.658) (1.025) (2.635) (2.187)
β
s
excellent -.429 .027 .081 .063
(2.895) (1.124) (2.631) (2.260)
β
s
verygood .792 -.004 .153 -.367
(2.863) (1.040) (2.633) (2.201)
β
s
good .066 -.018 .004 .072
(2.838) (.986) (2.634) (2.201)
β
s
fair -.168 ... -.006 .278
(2.944) (1.088) (2.630) (2.245)
σsβpoor 1.868 2.163 1.280 .997
(.860) (.249) (.343) (.281)
ρs .020 .010
(.037) (.010)
φs .848 .976 .895 .784
(.132) (0.059) (.047) (.043)
αsnc -.067 -.112 -1.730 -.358
(.093) (.089 ) (8.646) (.191)
σsα,nc .077 .038 .911 .223
(.089) (.011) (4.750) (.132)




i,c|βsi,c = 0, ρ 6= 0 Y Y N N
αsi,nc 6= αsi,c|βsi,c = 0, ρ = 0 N N Y Y
Monthly star value for caring types - poor 45.481 16.134 93.580 21.550
Overall monthly star value - poor 38.567 15.746 83.765 16.915
Monthly star value for caring types - fair 26.494 14.936 27.849 26.910
Overall monthly star value - fair 22.466 14.577 24.928 21.121
Monthly star value for caring types - good 29.341 18.449 26.307 29.780
Overall monthly star value - good 22.880 18.043 23.548 23.374
Monthly star value for caring types - very good 30.060 15.895 35.053 23.695
Overall monthly star value - very good 25.490 15.545 31.376 18.598
Monthly star value for caring types - excellent 20.685 17.801 22.541 29.284
Overall monthly star value - excellent 17.540 18.201 20.176 22.985
Table 3.16: Conjoint experiment estimates - Demographics: health
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(1) (2)
Consumer types Aware Unaware Aware Unaware
Variable
αsc,above25 -.216 -.160 -.068 -.089
(.025) (.014) (.018) (.014)
αsc,below18 .148 .029 -.031 -.036
(.029) (.012) (.023) (.018)
αsc,above18below25 .057 .051 -.016 -.014
(.025) (.014) (.025) (.019)
σsα,c,above25 .107 .071 .050 .041
(.016) (.009) (.009) (.014)
β
s
above25 3.080 2.377 2.474 2.779
(.328) (.275) (.528) (.413)
β
s
below18 -.740 -.041 .012 .011




.270 -.115 -.002 .026
(.067) (.037) 9.678) (.531)
σsβabove25 1.905 2.870 1.336 1.167
(.505) (.327) (.426) (.241)
ρs .035 .010
(.017) (.013)
φs .960 .950 .904 .769
(.045) (.043) .081 (.042)
αsnc -.210 -.160 -.449 -.573
(.189) (.092) (.862) (.330)
σsα,nc .107 .071 .252 .565
(.114) (.052) (.648) (.303)




i,c|βsi,c = 0, ρ 6= 0 Y Y N N
αsi,nc 6= αsi,c|βsi,c = 0, ρ = 0 N N Y Y
Monthly star value for caring types - > 25 14.228 14.796 36.038 30.965
Overall monthly star value - > 25 13.658 14.056 32.603 23.839
Monthly star value for caring types - ≤ 18 34.173 17.819 24.870 22.060
Overall monthly star value - ≤ 18 32.806 16.928 22.499 16.983
Monthly star value for caring types - > 18 ≤ 25 21.022 20.648 29.009 27.031
Overall monthly star value - > 18 ≤ 25 20.181 19.615 26.243 20.810
Table 3.17: Conjoint experiment estimates - Demographics: income
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(1) (2)
Consumer types Aware Unaware Aware Unaware
Variable
αsc,other -.185 -.134 -.123 -.109
(.025) (.015) (.033) (.019)
αsc,highschool .105 .017 .037 -.003
(.025) (.013) (.038) (.022)
αsc,bachelor .109 .032 .039 .014
(.022) (.013) (.035) (.023)
αsc,graduate .117 .039 .061 .014
(.026) (.015) (.037) (.023)
σsα,c,other .070 .035 .044 .050
(.011) (.010) (.010) (.007)
β
s
other 3.013 1.832 2.626 2.825
(.364) (.232) (.827) (.553)
β
s
highschool .067 -.019 .064 -.018
(.100) (.049) (1.052) (.617)
β
s
bachelor -.273 -.040 -.025 .014
(.074) (.050) (.933) (.635)
β
s
graduate -.036 .024 -.358 -.011
(.102) (.067) (.956) (.696)
σsβother .707 2.314 1.292 .955
(.589) (.264) 9.435) (.286)
ρs .035 0.011
(.027) (.010)
φs .833 0.973 .874 .769
(.047) (.057) (.067) (.042)
αsnc -.190 -.133 -.646 -.343
(.173) (.863) (1.186) (.168)
σsα,nc .070 .035 .412 .215
(.125) (.024) (.805) (.118)




i,c|βsi,c = 0, ρ 6= 0 Y Y N N
αsi,nc 6= αsi,c|βsi,c = 0, ρ = 0 N N Y Y
Monthly star value for caring types - other 16.273 13.661 21.274 25.737
Overall monthly star value - other 13.565 13.292 18.613 19.814
Monthly star value for caring types - high school 38.849 17.543 31.460 24.753
Overall monthly star value - high school 32.384 17.069 27.526 19.057
Monthly star value for caring types - bachelor 36.207 17.624 30.950 29.690
Overall monthly star value - bachelor 30.182 17.148 27.079 22.857
Monthly star value for caring types - graduate 44.209 19.521 36.774 29.631
Overall monthly star value - graduate 36.852 18.993 32.175 22.812
Table 3.18: Conjoint experiment estimates - Demographics: education
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Table 3.19: Do consumers use help?
Sources




Personal insurance company .047
Other .035
Table 3.20: Sources where consumers receive help when choosing plans
Types of help consumers receive
They suggested/chose a plan .669
They showed me PlanFinder .094
They helped me use PlanFinder .086
Other .151
Table 3.21: Ways consumers receive help when choosing plans
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Variable Not Slightly Moderately Important Very
Premium
Aware .028 .063 .183 .281 .442
Unaware .027 .056 .159 .270 .486
Copay/ Coinsurance
Aware .022 .040 .166 .379 .390
Unaware .027 .033 .119 .391 .427
Networks
Aware .028 .011 .091 .316 .551
Unaware .029 .024 .110 .313 .522
Star Ratings
Aware .034 .074 .224 .465 .201
Unaware .175 .114 .337 .247 .123
Drug Prescription
Aware .051 .057 .086 .293 .511
Unaware .065 .049 .094 .277 .513
Benefits
Aware .068 .126 .235 .264 .304
Unaware .105 .083 .220 .272 .317






































Figure 3.2: Filtering respondents
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Figure 3.3: Eliciting information on information.
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Figure 3.4: Informing respondents on the star ratings distribution.
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Figure 3.5: HCE example question
Figure 3.6: Price - Star differences variation in the conjoint experiments
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Figure 3.7: Price variation in the conjoint experiments
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Figure 3.8: Star variation in the conjoint experiments
Figure 3.9: Survey question referring to importance levels of plan characteris-




In this chapter, I build and estimate a full demand and supply structural
equilibrium model. On the demand side I build a flexible model that takes into
account the different existing consumer types–aware and unaware of the Star
Rating System (SRS)–combining the publicly available data that are provided
by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) with my survey
data. On the supply side I model insurers to compete on both prices and
star ratings, while also allowing for uncertainty to govern their choice for star
ratings. Finally, I use the estimates to conduct welfare analysis investigating
a series of different counterfactual scenarios.
4.1 Demand for Health Insurance Plans
In this section, I introduce a Bayesian learning discrete choice model
in the spirit of [26]. My model further allows for consumer awareness hetero-
geneity with respect to the SRS. The model builds upon the demand model
of [91] and the more recent models of [29] and [73].
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4.1.1 Assumptions/ Primitives
As it is standard in the literature, I define markets at a county level,
and I assume that, in every market, m = 1, 2, ...,M , there is a set of insurers,
km = 1, ..., Km, each offering a set of plans, jkm = 1, ..., Jkm in year t. I classify
the different characteristics that determine the quality of a health insurance
plan in three categories. The first category includes characteristics, xkjmt,
which refer to the general benefit design (e.g., drug, dental coverage), which
is observed both by the consumers and the econometrician. The second cate-
gory includes characteristics, ξkjmt, such as advertising and provider networks
that are observed by consumers only.1 The third category includes charac-
teristics, qkjmt, which refer to customer satisfaction and clinical outcomes. I
assume that these characteristics are unobserved by both the consumers and
the econometrician until the introduction of the Star Rating System (SRS).
Plans in every market are differentiated with respect to premium, pkjmt, and
all other characteristics, xkmjt, ξkjmt, and qkjmt.
There are two main periods: the pre-SRS and the post-SRS period. In
the pre-SRS period, consumers form some prior beliefs about qkjmt and then
choose their most preferred plan. In the post-SRS period, signals for quality,
qkjmt, are given to consumers in the form of star ratings, rkt. Consumers who
are aware of the SRS update their prior beliefs in a Bayesian fashion and then
1It is arguably accepted in the literature that advertising and provider networks are two
characteristics that consumers observe and value when they make their choice decisions.
With the exception of [6], researchers/econometricians can rarely observe this information.
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choose their most preferred plan. Consumers who are not aware of the SRS
behave as if they were in the pre-SRS period and choose their most preferred
plan based on their prior beliefs.
Let uikjmt denote consumer i’s utility when enrolled in plan j offered
by insurer k in market m of year t. I assume that the consumer is risk neutral.
Then, the expected utility she gains from this plan conditional on the plan
characteristics and her personal taste is given by:
E[uikjmt|xkjmt, θi, εikjmt] =
= αipkjmt + βiE[qkjmt|xkjmt, θi, εikjmt] + γxkjmt + ξkjmt + ε̃ikjmt,
(4.1)
where xkjmt = (pkjmt, xkjmt, ξkjmt) is a vector of the plan characteristics ob-
served by the consumer, and θi = (αi, βi)
′ is a vector that represents her
preferences with respect to pkjmt and qkjmt, respectively. Finally, ε̃ikjmt is a
zero mean i.i.d. stochastic error term that follows the Type I extreme-value
distribution across plans and consumers and represents i’s idiosyncratic tastes.
With this set of assumptions, caring for prices and other characteristics, the
consumer chooses the plan j that maximizes her current expected utility.
I assume that consumers have heterogenous preferences for pkjmt and
qkjmt, allowing for flexible substitution patterns that are not contaminated by
the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives property and also allowing for the
possibility that consumers might not care at all about qkjmt. Consumer pref-
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w/ prob. 1− φ
,
(4.2)
where with probability φ consumer i cares about qkjmt and with probability
1 − φ she does not care about it. Caring consumers’ preferences for pkjmt
and qkjmt are represented by a vector of two random coefficients, (αi,c, βic)
′,
which are jointly normally distributed according to the top part of eq. 4.2.
Non-caring consumers’ preferences for pkjmt and qkjmt are represented by a
random coefficient, αi,nc, which is normally distributed, and a mass point at
zero, respectively, according to the bottom part of eq. 4.2. One could possibly
argue that consumers might not care about other characteristics as well. While
in theory this might be true, in practice it has been shown that consumers care
about both characteristics xkjmt and ξkjmt.
2
Consumers who do not choose a Medicare Advantage (MA) plan have
the option to choose Traditional Medicare (TM), which is considered to be the
outside option in this market. The utility consumer i receives from choosing
TM is given by:
ui0mt = q̃0 + βiqTM + ε̃i0mt, (4.3)
2Allowing for a more flexible model in which consumers have no preferences for other
characteristics than qkjmt is possible, but it is beyond the scope of this study.
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where qTM represents the quality of TM with respect to clinical outcomes and
customer service.3 I normalize the utility gained from the outside option by
subtracting ui0mt from each uikjmt. Then, the utility specification of eq. 4.1
takes the following form:
E[uikjmt|xkjmt, θi, εikjmt] =
= q0 + αipkjmt + βi(E[qkjmt|xkjmt, θi, εikjmt]− qTM) + γxkjmt + ξkjmt + εikjmt,
(4.4)
where εikjmt = ε̃ikjmt− ε̃i0mt is distributed logistic as the difference of two type
I extreme value distributions and q0 = −q̃0.
4.1.2 Choice of Health Insurance Plan
In this section, I describe the demand model before and after the intro-
duction of the SRS. The utility specification depends on the different existing
consumer types, as in [13].
4.1.2.1 Choice of Health Insurance Plan Before SRS
Although plan characteristics xkjmt and prices pkjmt could affect con-
sumer beliefs about qkjmt, I make the simplifying assumption that consumers
do not use this information to form their beliefs. Characteristics xkjmt that
compose the benefit design of a plan do not reflect either customer satisfac-
tion or clinical outcomes that compose quality, qkjmt, a fact that justifies this
3This is the same dimension of quality the SRS is providing information on.
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assumption.4 The positive relation between star ratings and prices shown on
table 2.2 would make it more reasonable to assume that prices contain some
information about this dimension of quality. For computational tractability, I
assume that consumers do not take this relation into account. However, on the
supply side I will allow firms to price star ratings. Hence, consumers perceive
that quality, qkjmt, is drawn from the following distribution:
qkjmt ∼ N(µ0, σ20), (4.5)
and the mean of their prior beliefs is given by:
E[qkjmt|pkjmt, xkjmt, ξkjmt, θi, εikjmt] = µ0. (4.6)
Under this assumption and conditional on prices and all the dimensions of
quality, consumer i chooses the plan that maximizes her current expected
utility, which takes the following form:
E[uikjmt|xkjmt, θi, εikjmt] = q0 + αipkjmt + βi(µ0 − qTM) + γxkjmt + ξkjmt + εikjmt.
(4.7)
The set of individual attributes that lead to the choice of plan j is defined as
follows:
Akjmt(x.mt, p.mt, ξ.mt; θ) =
= (θi, εi0mt, ..., εikjmt|uikjmt ≥ uiljmt∀l = 0, 1, ..., K, j = 1, 2, ..., Jk).
(4.8)
4The fact that there is no relation between star ratings–which are the signals of qkjmt–and
plan characteristics, as table 2.2 shows, further validates this point.
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Given the distributional assumption on εikjmt, the market share of j-th plan is
given by:











exp(q0 + αipkj′mt + βi(µ0 − qTM) + γxkj′mt + ξkj′mt)
dθif(θi),
(4.9)
where θi = (αi, βi)
′ is distributed as a mixture of two normal distributions
with density f(θi) = φf(θi,c) + (1 − φ)f(θi,nc), with θi,c = (αi,c, βi,c)′ and
θi,nc = (αi,nc, βi,nc)
′. The expected consumer surplus for an individual i given







exp(q0 + αipkjmt + βi(µ0 − qTM) + γxkjmt + ξkjmt)).
(4.10)
4.1.2.2 Choice of Health Insurance Plan After SRS
After the introduction of the SRS, individuals receive signals for quality,
qkjmt, in the form of star ratings, rkjmt. Star ratings are assigned at a contract
level, and all plans offered by a specific contract get the same star rating.
Remember that every insurer for every market in which it operates signs a
contract with Medicare under which the insurer offers a set of different plans,
each corresponding to a different benefit design. Hence, by assigning star
ratings at a contract level, CMS assigns star ratings at an insurer-market, km,
level. Since all plans j offered by an insurer k get the same star ratings, for the
rest of the analysis I will suppress the index j in variables qkjmt and rkjmt. I
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assume that the signal through the star rating is distributed normally around
the true quality, qkmt as follows:
rkmt ∼ N(qkmt, σ2r), (4.11)
where σr represents the noise the star ratings send to consumers. Consumers
who are aware of the SRS receive these signals and update their beliefs in a
Bayesian fashion. The mean of their posterior beliefs becomes:
E[qkmt|pkjmt, xkjmt, ξkjmt, rkmt, θi, εikjmt] = wrkmt + (1− w)µ0, (4.12)
where w represents the weight consumers put on the signal they receive and is





. If the star ratings are precise, then σr → 0 and w → 1,
and thus when forming their posterior beliefs, consumers put all the weight
on the signals. Conversely, if the star ratings are very noisy, then σr → ∞
and w → 0, and thus when forming their posterior beliefs, consumers place no
weight on the signals.5 Consumers who are not aware of the SRS behave as if
they were in the pre-SRS period.
Let Λi be a discrete random variable that indicates whether consumer




1 w/ prob. λ
0 w/ prob. 1− λ
. (4.13)
5Under the assumption that both the prior beliefs and the signal are normally distributed,
the variance of the posterior beliefs is V ar[qkt] = wσ
2
r . However, since I have assumed that
consumers are risk neutral, I cannot identify it.
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Under these assumptions and conditional on all the plan characteristics and
her type, consumer i will choose the plan that maximizes her current expected
utility, which takes the following form:
E[uikjmt|xkjmt, rkmt, θi, εikjmt, λi] =
=
{
q0 + αipkjmt + βi(wrkmt + (1− w)µ0 − qTM) + γxkjmt + ξkjmt + εikjmt if Λi = 1
q0 + αipkjmt + βi(µ0 − qTM) + γxkjmt + ξkjmt + εikjmt if Λi = 0
.
(4.14)
Given the distributional assumption on εikjmt, the market share of the j-th
plan is given by:























exp(q0 + αipkj′mt + βi(µ0 − rTM) + γxkj′mt + ξkj′mt)
dθif(θi),
(4.15)
where θi = (αi, βi)
′ is distributed as a mixture of two normal distributions, as
noted in the previous section. The expected consumer surplus for an individual







exp(q0 + αipkjmt + βi(wrkmt + (1− w)µ0 − qTM) + γxkjmt + ξkjmt))+





exp(q0 + αipkjmt + βi(µ0 − qTM) + γxkjmt + ξkjmt)).
(4.16)
The set of parameters to be estimated is (q0, qTM , αc, β, σα,c, ρ, αnc, σα,nc, φ, λ, γ, w, µ0).
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As mentioned in the second chapter, a major challenge arises in sep-
arately identifying consumers who are not aware of the SRS from consumers
who do not care about star ratings, rkt, since all these different consumer types
seem observationally equal in the aggregate level data. Intuitively, if we as-
sume that the star ratings are perfectly informative, i.e., w = 1, consumers
who are not aware of the SRS behave as if they do not care about quality, qkt.
Taking into account that the star ratings might not be perfect signals of qkmt
complicates the situation further.6
I overcome this challenge, using the data that are coming from the
survey I conducted. Having identified the groups of consumers who are aware/
unaware of the SRS, and having elicited both groups’ preferences for star
ratings, I combine these results into the main demand model, and I recover the
rest parameters of interest. It is important to notice, here, that respondents’
preferences for star ratings represent a composite of consumer preferences for
qkmt and the weight, w, they put on the information the star ratings provide
as signals of qkmt.
7
4.1.3 Estimation
After I recover from the survey the proportions of the population that
are aware and unaware of the SRS as well as the preferences of each group for
6See section 1.2 of the appendix for further details on the identification challenge in this
model specifically.
7An additional round of surveys in which I “change” respondents’ prior beliefs about
quality would be necessary to recover the weight, w consumers put on the information they
receive.
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star ratings, I estimate the parameters of the main demand model following
the algorithm used by [76]. In doing so, I plug the estimated random coeffi-
cients, α̂si , β̂
s
i , which I recovered from the survey, into the main demand model.
Because the coefficient β̂si refers to preferences for star ratings, I assume that
star ratings are perfect signals of quality, qkjmt, in the main model, and thus
the weight consumers put on the information they receive amounts to one,
i.e., w = 1. Combining two different sources of choice data–revealed prefer-
ence and stated preference–requires that I control for potential differences in
the idiosyncratic tastes between survey respondents and actual consumers. To
do so, I use a rescale parameter, κ. Rescaling has the advantage of preserving
the shape of the distribution of the preferences recovered from the survey in
the main model, while at the same time it leads to more consistent estimates.




q0 + κ · (α̂sipkjmt + β̂si (rkt − qTM)) + γxkjmt + ξkjmt + εikjmt w/ prob. λ̂




which, given the distributional assumption of εikjmt, results in the following
market shares equation:

















exp(q0 + κ(α̂sipkj′mt + β̂
s
i (rkt − qTM)) + γxkj′mt + ξkj′mt)



















exp(q0 + κ(α̂sipkj′mt + β̂
s
i (µ0 − qTM)) + γxkj′mt + ξkj′mt)




The set of parameters that needs to be estimated then reduces to (q0, qTM , µ0, γ, κ).
The key point of the estimation exploits a population moment condition
that is a product of instrumental variables and a structural error term, ξ(θ),
to form a non-linear Generalized-Method-of-Moment (GMM) estimator, as
in [14]. The key identifying assumption is the population moment condition
that requires a set of exogenous instrumental variables. Formally, letting Z =
[z1, ..., zM ] be a set of instruments, the required population moment condition
is
E[Z · ξ(θ∗)] = 0, (4.19)
where ξ is the error term as a function of the model parameters and θ∗ denotes
the true value parameters.
A common identification challenge is that differences in prices may re-
flect differences in the part of the quality, ξkjmt, that is unobserved by the
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econometrician. As mentioned in a previous section, the most important com-
ponent of this part of quality is the plan’s network of providers. To solve this
problem, I rely on the panel structure of my data and exploit variation within
an insurer contract in a similar fashion to [29]. This has the benefit, as the
authors also mention, of utilizing the structure of the program under which
plans within a contract share the same provider network. Moreover, I also use
a set of time fixed effects to account for the possibility that the introduction
of the QBP affected demand. Hence, I decompose ξkjmt as follows:
ξkjmt = ξk + ξt + ∆ξkjmt, (4.20)
where ∆ξkjmt measures the deviation in “market-specific” product tastes from
these means.
The source of endogeneity is now limited to the set of unobservables that
vary across the unobservables, ∆ξkjmt, and the population moment condition
is reduced to:
E[Z ·∆ξ(θ∗)] = 0. (4.21)




where A is a consistent estimate of E[Z ′∆ξ∆ξ′Z]. To compute these unob-
served characteristics, ∆ξkjmt, I first solve for the structural errors, ξkjmt, that
solve the system of equations
s.mt(x.mt, p.mt, r.mt, ξ.mt; θ) = S.mt, (4.23)
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where s.mt and S.mt are the predicted and observed market shares, respectively.
Then, following [76] I regress the estimated fixed effects, ξ̂kjmt, on contract and
time fixed effects, ξk, ξt, respectively, and compute the residual, ∆̂ξkjmt. Thus,




For the remaining source of endogeneity hidden in ∆ξ, I use as in-
struments the average non-price attributes of other plans offered by the same
insurer and the average non-price attributes of plans offered by competing
insurers under the assumption that they are exogenous. These instruments
are commonly known in the Industrial Organization literature as BLP instru-
ments and are based on pricing concepts. Specifically, the idea is that each
insurer will price each of its plans in a way that takes into account the substi-
tution with other insurers’ plans. For example, when an insurer is considering
to increasing the price of its plan, consumers who will switch away from this
plan to another of the same firm’s plans do not represent as much of a loss as
consumers who will switch to other firms’ plans.
4.1.4 Results
Table 4.1 presents the estimates of Equation 4.17 across different spec-
ifications. All specifications assume that rtm = 4 and that µ0 = rkt. The first
two columns present estimates that do not include instrumental variables,
111
while the last two present estimates after including instrumental variables.8
The rescale parameter is slightly lower in the specifications that do not in-
clude instrumental variables compared to the ones that include them. The
preference parameters for the different benefits are similar across all the spec-
ifications. Consistent with OLS estimates on price elasticities being closer
to 0, I focus on the IV specifications (3) and (4). Specifically, my preferred
specification is (4), as it includes both contract and year fixed effects.
Among all benefits, consumers are more willing to pay for drug cover-
age. Specifically, consumer willingness to pay for drug coverage is on average
$170. Such a high level is not surprising, as Part D coverage is very costly
for beneficiaries. [36] find a similar result. Consumer willingness to pay for
the other characteristics is significantly lower. It is interesting to notice that
consumer willingness to pay for star ratings based on the survey estimates is
close to consumer willingness to pay for these benefits, and it is not as high as
it is for drug coverage. This observation indicates that consumers do not value
star ratings as much as they value drug coverage. However, whether the value
for star ratings represents the actual value for the dimension of quality that
refers to clinical outcomes and customer satisfaction is not clear. The mean
own-price elasticity in my preferred specification amounts to -1.226, implying
that a 1% increase in price will decrease the enrollment of a plan by 1.16%.
This implies that consumers are moderately elastic, which is not surprising
since MA is a subsidized market where most prices are close to zero.
8Standard errors are currently work in progress.
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4.2 Supply Side
In this section, I introduce a model in which insurers compete on both
prices, p, and quality, q, endogenizing the information environment and the
financial incentives they receive. By allowing firms to compete on more than
one dimension, the model resembles that of [44] and the more recent model of
[73].
4.2.1 Assumptions/ Primitives
I allow competition to occur at the county level, which is standard in
the literature ([91], [29], [73]). In each year, t, and every market, m, there
is a total number of insurers, Km, each indexed by k = 1, 2, ..., Km. Every
insurer offers a set of plans Jk, each indexed by j = 1, 2, ..., Jk. Insurers in
every market and every year compete with each other simultaneously in two
stages. In the first stage, they choose an average level of quality, q̃k, which
will characterize the set of plans they offer. In the second stage, star ratings,
rk, are realized, and then insurers choose prices, pkj, for each plan they offer.
For ease of exposition, in the rest of the section I suppress the indices mt.
The fact that the modes of the average summary rates distributions of
figure 2.4 are not precisely at the thresholds where star ratings are assigned
indicates that insurers cannot perfectly predict the final level of quality that
will arise after they make their choice. CMS tends to make numerous changes
in the algorithm it uses to construct the star ratings, some of which are pre-
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announced while others are not.9 Hence, the final realized level of quality, qk,
is governed by some noise, ηk, that represents the uncertainty firms carry with
respect to CMS’ changes and is given by:
qk = q̃k + ηk, (4.25)
where η ∼ N(0, σ2η). It is critical to remember that, although firms choose q̃k,
consumers observe only the final level of star rating, rk, which results based
on the following formula:
rk = g(qk) =

...
2 if 1.75 ≤ qk < 2.25
...
5 if qk ≥ 4.75
. (4.26)
4.2.2 Profit Function







∗(q̃, η), q̃, η;χ)
)
dF (ηk, η−k), (4.27)
where πIIk (p
∗(q̃, η), q̃;χ) represents variable profits from offering insurance ser-
vices given the equilibrium price, p∗(q̃, η), which arises in the second stage.
The variable profits, πIIk , of the insurer are determined by the price, pj, the
9CMS tends to make numerous changes regarding many aspects of the MA market, and
it is the responsibility of insurers to keep track of them. It is common that insurers cannot
do this perfectly.
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insurer sets, the marginal cost, mcj it incurs for each of the services it offers,
and the subsidy, Kj, it receives for each plan j it offers, and they are given by:
πIIk (p, r, x, ξ, θ;χ) =
∑
j∈Jk
[(pj −mcj +Kj)Msj(p, r, x, ξ; θ)] . (4.28)
I model the marginal cost, mcj, to be log-linear in star ratings, rj, charac-
teristics, xj, and some unobserved to the econometrician component, ωj, as
follows:





10 The subsidy each plan receives per enrollee it serves is a
function of the star rating and is given by:
Kj = K(ψt(rk), K̃j) = ψt(rk) · K̃j, (4.30)
where ψt(rk) represents the level of the bonus insurers receive depending on
their star ratings for different years t = {2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016}. For
example, for t = {2015, 2016}, ψt(rk) is given by:
ψt(rk) =
{
1.05 if rk ≥ 4
1 o/w
. (4.31)
The formula is adjusted accordingly for years t = {2012, 2013, 2014}. Finally,
K̃j represents the payment each plan receives from the government for each
enrollee it serves after risk adjustment.
10By setting rj =
1
Jk
rk, I split the marginal cost a firm incurs among all the plans it offers
equally.
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4.2.3 Necessary Equilibrium Conditions
I now derive the optimality conditions for prices and quality.11 These
conditions will be used to identify the cost health insurers incur for the services
they provide and the quality they produce.
An insurer makes two decisions in two sequential stages. I solve the
insurer’s problem backwards and derive the necessary equilibrium conditions
for prices and quality as follows. Given the quality level, qk, that arises in the
first stage, the price optimality condition that arises in the second stage for
each plan j insurer k offers is given by:
∂πIIk
∂pj







Using matrix notation, the First Order Conditions (FOCs) for the plans offered
in a market are represented by:
s(p, r)− Ω(p−mc+K) = 0, (4.33)
where Ω = Ω∗jl ∗ Sjl, with Ωjl =
{
1 if j, l ∈ Jk
0 otherwise
, and Sjl a matrix whose jl
element is given by sjl = −∂sl(p,r)∂pj . The difference between this first-order con-
dition and a standard first-order condition lies in the term K, which represents
the subsidy each health insurer receives from Medicare.
In the first stage, insurers choose quality, q̃k. Given the price equilib-
rium vector, p∗ = p(r) that arises in the second stage of the game, the problem
11Following the literature, I assume that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists. Finding
the conditions for the existence of the equilibrium is beyond the scope of this study.
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Prob(r(q̃, η) = z|q̃) (4.34)
where z is a variable of integration that can take values r ∈ Rs, where Rs =
{0.5, 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, 3, 3.5, 4, 4.5, 5} represent all the values that star ratings can













I estimate the parameters of interest, τ, ση, in two stages. First, I
estimate the marginal cost parameters, τ , using the FOCs with respect to
price that arise in the second stage of the game. Second, given the estimated
parameters, τ̂ , I estimate the parameter ση using the Simulated Maximum
Likelihood method. This parameter is identified by the spread of the modes
around the thresholds at which star ratings are realized.
More precisely, in the first stage, I use the FOCs to recover the marginal
cost firm k incurs for each plan j it offers, and then I use a simple OLS
regression in the following model:
ln(p+K − Ω−1s(p, r)) = τ x̃+ ω, (4.36)
where τ = (τr, τx) is a vector of the marginal cost parameters and x̃ = (r, x)
is a vector of star ratings and the rest of the plan characteristics.
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k + σηη̃k, (4.37)
which is invertible in the error term, η̃k ∼ N(0, 1). Hence, I estimate the
parameter ση by maximizing the following likelihood function, as follows:
max
σ































where q̃∗k is the equilibrium quality that arises after the firm solves its profit
optimization problem in the first stage. The second line in the above equation
results from the assumption that the errors ηk are independent across firms
in every market. I estimate the above parameters using the following nested
algorithm.
Given guesses for the parameters ση,
1. For each firm k and each plan j, solve for the prices pkj that maximize
the profits of the firm for each different star rating level.
2. Given the prices p∗kj(r) that arose in the previous step, for each firm k
solve for quality q̃k that maximizes eq. 4.34
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3. Given the optimized values q̃∗k, solve for the parameters that maximize
the likelihood function given in eq. 4.38.
4.2.4 Results
Table 4.2 reports estimates of equation 4.29. I include market fixed
effects to account for costs that stem from geography. Specifications (2) and
(4) also consider the possibility that the cost is increasing in star ratings, but
at a decreasing rate. All the cost sharing plan design parameters enter with
the correct sign and are statistically significant. My preferred specification
and the one I use for the estimation of ση is specification (3). According to
that specification, on average, the cost of a plan given all the benefits it offers
is $620. An extra star rating increases the cost of the firm by 4%. Hence, it
costs the average firm $25 to increase quality by an extra star rating. Offering
drug coverage increases the cost of a firm by 21%, which is significantly higher
than the cost the star ratings impose on insurers.
Lastly, the coefficient that captures the noise of the star ratings is given
in Table 4.3. The standard deviation of the noise of star ratings amounts to
1.4 (in the range of 0 to 5), with a standard error equal to 0.035. Such a high
standard deviation implies that, even though firms may target specific quality
levels, the final star rating level that might be realized can be up to three
standard deviations above or below the chosen level. This high magnitude is
not surprising. The number of different individual metrics that are included in
the composition of the final overall star rating is very high (30 – 44 performance
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metrics), and the model does not rationalize the variation that is coming from
them.
4.2.5 Model Fit
To evaluate the model fit, I compare the predicted distributions of
multiple variables that arise in equilibrium to the distributions of the corre-
sponding variables that I observe in the data. Specifically, I focus on plan
prices, government payments, and market shares. To construct the predicted
distribution of prices, given the demand and supply estimates, I firstly com-
pute the quality q̃∗k each firm chooses. Given this quality level, I calculate the
probability that each star rating level will arise, Prob(r(q̃, η) = z|q̃). Having
also calculated the prices that arise in equilibrium, p∗(z; θ, χ) for every star
rating level, I then calculate the expected price. I follow a similar procedure
for the government expenditures and market shares. Figure 4.1 presents a ker-
nel density plot of the predicted and observed distributions of the plan prices.
The vertical line represents the mean of the respective distribution. Overall,
across all observations, the average monthly price is observed to be $51.67,
while it is predicted to be $38.11. Figures 4.2 and 4.3 present kernel density
plots of the predicted and observed distributions of the government payments
and firm market shares. The average monthly payment to a plan is observed
to be $833.03 and is predicted to be $818.64, and the market share of a plan
is observed to be 0.15 and is predicted to be 0.16.
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4.3 Welfare analysis
In this section, I evaluate the relative impact of the two policies–SRS
and QBP–on Consumer Surplus (CS), firm profits, government expenditures,
and, ultimately, welfare. I compare outcomes that arise under three different
levels of information structure: (i) full information, λ = 1, (ii) current level of
information, λ = 0.22, and (iii) no information, λ = 0 and under two “supply-
side” policy environments: (i) no quality subsidies provision and (ii) quality
subsidies provision. Consequently, I end up with a combination of six different
hypothetical environments that I compare and analyze.
For each set of counterfactuals, I compute the new quality, price, firm
cost, firm profits, consumer surplus, and government expenditures that arise
in equilibrium. In doing so, I use the estimates I recovered from my full equi-
librium model of supply and demand. Given the demand and cost estimates
in column (4) of Table 4.1 and column (3) of Table 4.2, respectively, I solve
for the prices that arise in equilibrium for each star rating level using eq. 4.32.
Given these prices and the estimate of Table 4.3, I then solve for the optimal
level of quality, q∗j , using eq. 4.35. Of course, the level of quality that will
finally arise cannot be predicted since it depends on the distribution of the er-
ror ηk and the draw that will be realized. Hence, I proceed by computing the
expected cost of a firm for providing its services, E[Cj], as well as the expected
price, E[p∗j ], market shares, E[sj], profits, E[πj], consumer surplus, E[CSi] and
government expenditures, E[Kj], which arise in equilibrium. To keep compu-




Table 4.4 summarizes outcomes under each of the six policy environ-
ments in a median monopolistic market. Table 4.7 also presents the equi-
librium outcomes that arise on average taking into account all monopolistic
markets. None of the patterns that are observed in table 4.4 change on av-
erage. Hence, I focus on one monopolistic market only to better describe the
intuition behind the outcomes that arise. The table shows the level of quality
chosen in equilibrium, q̃∗j , the firm’s expected profits, E[πj], the expected con-
sumer surplus, E[CSi], and the expected payment, E[Kj], the plan receives
from Medicare. The top panel presents the outcomes that arise without the
provision of quality subsidies under the three different information environ-
ments of interest. Similarly, the bottom panel presents the outcomes that
arise with the provision of quality subsidies under the three different informa-
tion environments of interest. All monetary values are expressed in dollars per
month per plan per enrollee.
As indicated in the table, quality, q̃∗j , increases as consumers become
more informed under both “supply-side” policy environments. Figure 4.4 pro-
vides a better sense of the impact of each policy on the quality that is realized
in equilibrium. The graph presents the equilibrium quality levels that arise
for different levels of information under both “supply-side” regulatory envi-
ronments. The horizontal axis represents the different levels of information, λ,
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and the vertical axis represents the levels of quality, q̃∗j , that are chosen by the
firm in equilibrium. Clearly, both the information provision and the quality
bonus subsidy policies increase quality. Interestingly, it turns that, if 50% of
the Medicare population was aware of the SRS, the market could realize the
same level of quality under the implementation of the “demand-side” policy
only as it currently does at λ = 0.22 under the implementation of both the
“demand- and supply-side” policies.
Table 4.4 further shows that in more informed environments the prof-
itability of the firm decreases on average. This is not surprising. Firms are
able to experience higher profits when consumers are not well informed about
the true quality by charging higher prices. Tables 4.8, 4.9, and 4.10 explain
this by displaying the equilibrium prices, market shares, and profits for each
star rating level, respectively, under all the hypothetical scenarios of interest.
In the case where consumers are uninformed, i.e., λ = 0, at star rating levels
that are lower than consumers’ prior beliefs about quality, rj ≤ µ0 = 3.7, firms
set high prices, taking advantage of consumers’ inaccurate beliefs about the
actual level of quality. Similarly, because consumers believe that these plans
are better than what they actually are, the demand is higher compared to the
case where consumers are aware of the exact level of quality. Consequently,
firms are able to experience higher profits when consumers are uninformed.
The opposite patterns are observed when the star rating levels are above the
level of consumers’ prior beliefs, rj > µ0 = 3.7. Interestingly, comparing the
profits that arise under the different “supply-side” policy environments fixing
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the information environment, the expected profits of the firm remain almost
constant. Although, as table 4.10 shows, the firm realizes higher profits at the
star rating levels where the bonuses are awarded, it is expected that they will
remain the same.
The fifth column of table 4.4 displays the levels of the expected con-
sumer surplus that arise under the six scenarios of interest. Consumer surplus
increases as consumers become more informed. This increase is explained by
two reasons that are also conveyed in table 4.11. First, as consumers become
more informed quality increases, and thus consumer surplus increases since
consumer utility is increasing in quality. Second, as consumers become more
informed, they base their choice decisions on the realized star rating levels, ig-
noring their prior beliefs. Hence, the firm prices its plan appropriately, leading
to lower prices. Since consumer utility is decreasing in prices, the consumer
surplus increases. Interestingly, the increase in consumer surplus is not very
high. When profits decrease by 30% when we move from a fully uninformed,
λ = 0, to a fully informed, λ = 1, environment, consumer surplus increases
only by 9.68%. Overall, this increase is not enough to cover the decrease of the
firm profitability, and consequently, the overall welfare decreases. This con-
troversial result implies that the information the SRS provides to consumers
cannot lead to significant welfare improvement. Comparing the levels of con-
sumer surplus that arise under the different “supply-side” policy environments
fixing the information environment, the expected consumer surplus increases
slightly. This increase is explained mainly by the lower prices the firm offers
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when it receives the bonuses at the higher star rating levels, as shown in table
4.8.
The last column of table 4.4 shows that the government expenditures in-
crease as consumers become more informed only in the case where the “supply-
side” QBP is implemented. This is not surprising. As consumers become more
informed, quality increases, and thus the bonus subsidies increase.
4.3.2 Evaluation of the current policies
Star Rating System: Table 4.5 displays how the SRS affected the
MA market. Informing 22% of the Medicare population, the SRS led to a
net increase in quality by 0.12. This increase raised the monthly cost of the
firm per enrollee it serves by $3, while it did not affect significantly either the
expected equilibrium prices or market shares. The monthly expected profits
of the firm decreased by $2.5, the consumer surplus increased by $0.4, while
the government expenditures remained the same. Overall, these changes imply
that, although quality increased, the overall welfare decreased due to the higher
decrease in the expected profits compared to the increase in the consumer
surplus.
Quality Bonus Program: Table 4.6 displays how the QBP affected the
MA market given that the proportion of consumers that is informed is λ =
0.22. The implementation of the QBP led to a net increase in quality of 0.19.
This increase raised the monthly cost of the firm per enrollee it serves by
$5, decreased the expected monthly price by $1.64, and had no effect on the
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market shares. The monthly expected profits of the firm only increased by
$0.31 per enrollee it serves, the consumer surplus increased by $1.24, while
the government expenditures increased by $6. Interestingly, of the extra $6
the government spends for the realized quality improvement, only 25% of it
is justified by the realized increase of the total welfare. The remaining 75%,
which amounts to an annual level of $1.2b, is not rationalized.12
Discussion: A caveat of my analysis is that it does not address the credibility
of the star ratings as signals of quality or whether the dimension of quality
the star ratings signal on is valued by consumers. In my analysis, I have
not separately identified the weight, w, consumers put on the information
they receive through the star ratings, r, from their willingness to pay for
quality, q. Hence, I do not know whether the small size of the consumer
surplus improvement is due to the low quality of the star ratings as signals of
quality or the low consumer willingness to pay for this dimension of quality. In
either case, the total value consumers allocate to star ratings does not increase
consumer surplus enough to improve welfare overall.
A question arises regarding the utilization of the expenditure level that
is not rationalized by the realized welfare improvement. Does the QBP gener-
ate some positive externality that justifies this level of expenditure, or is this
level just wasted? There are a few different forms that could reflect a poten-
tial positive externality. For example, one could show the improved health of
consumers resulting from the realized quality improvement. Interestingly, [1]
121.2b = 476× 12 (months) × 24m (MA population) .
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provide evidence of the opposite pattern: star ratings are positively correlated
with the mortality measure they use as a general proxy of health outcomes,
suggesting that higher-ranked plans have higher mortality rates. No evidence
regarding other health outcomes and their relation to the star ratings has
been documented. Another form of positive externality could refer to the
market failure the consumer misinformation creates. When consumers think
that quality is higher than what it already is, they are misled. By increas-
ing quality, the QBP brings the equilibrium quality levels closer to consumer
beliefs and might correct for this failure. In either case, an extra star rating
should generate an amount of $23 per month per enrollee a plan serves to
justify the amount that is not rationalized by the observed welfare increase.
My study remains agnostic regarding whether this level of positive externality
is actually generated or whether the expenditures that are not rationalized by
welfare improvement constitute a loss.
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Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable
κ .063 .068 .077 .087
q0 -4.909 -4.753 .935 -8.144
γdrug 1.269 1.308 1.431 1.485
γvision .086 .086 .207 .180
γdental .154 .111 .233 .199
γhear -.030 .073 .103 .283
Willingness to pay (in$/month) for:
drug covg 210.00 218.00 187.72 171.83
vision covg 14.33 14.33 27.12 20.89
dental covg 25.66 18.5 30.56 23.10
hear covg -5.00 12.16 13.51 32.86
Mean own-price elasticity -.857 -.921 -1.032 -1.164
Year FEs N Y N Y
Contract FEs Y Y Y Y
IVs N N Y Y
Observations 61146 61146 61146 61146
Table 4.1: Full demand dstimates
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
τr -.020*** .583*** .041*** .382***
(.001) (.020) (.003) (.029)
τr2 -.082*** -.046***
(.002) (.004)
τdrug .229*** .223*** .211*** .211***
(.003) (.003) (.004) (.004)
τvision .025*** .021*** .025*** .022***
(.002) (.002) (.004) (.004)
τdental .055*** .059*** .044*** .046***
(.002) (.002) (.003) (.003)
τhear -.007*** .005*** -.017*** -.008**
(.002) (.002) (.003) (.003)
τ0 6.401*** 5.320*** 6.194*** 5.583***
(.007) (.036) (.012) (.052)
Market FEs N N Y Y
Adj. R2 .125 .140 .133 .138
Observations 61146 61146 61146 61146





Table 4.3: Noise of star ratings
q̃∗j E[πj] E[CSi] E[Kj]
w/o QBP
λ = 0.00 2.075 30.12 16.73 757
λ = 0.22 2.195 27.63 17.13 757
λ = 1.00 2.899 21.20 18.35 757
w/ QBP
λ = 0.00 2.221 30.24 17.80 762
λ = 0.22 2.386 27.94 18.37 763
λ = 1.00 3.250 23.92 20.57 770
Table 4.4: Market equilibrium outcomes
q̃∗j E[Cj] E[pj] E[sj] E[πj] E[CSi] E[Kj]
λ = 0 2.075 667 47.77 .218 30.12 16.73 757
λ = 0.222 2.195 670 47.83 .204 27.63 17.13 757
Net changes .120 3 .060 -.014 -2.490 .400 0
Table 4.5: Evaluation of the SRS
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q̃∗j E[Cj] E[pj] E[sj] E[πj] E[CSi] E[Kj]
w/o QBP 2.195 670 47.83 .204 27.63 17.13 757
w/ QBP 2.386 675 46.19 .206 27.94 18.37 763
Net changes .191 5 -1.640 .002 .310 1.240 6
Table 4.6: Evaluation of the QBP
q̃∗j E[πj] E[CSi] E[Kj]
w/o QBP
λ = 0.00 2.085 27.47 16.78 810
λ = 0.22 2.177 26.95 17.04 810
λ = 1.00 2.663 21.46 1.75 810
w/ QBP
λ = 0.00 2.223 27.64 17.56 814
λ = 0.22 2.346 26.17 17.90 816
λ = 1.00 2.969 22.80 18.97 821
Table 4.7: Average market equilibrium outcomes for monopolistic markets
Star Ratings
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
w/o QBP
λ = 0.00 11 21 31 42 53 65 77 90 103 117
λ = 0.22 7 17 28 39 51 64 77 90 104 118
λ = 1.00 0 5 18 32 46 61 76 91 107 123
w/ QBP
λ = 0.00 11 21 31 42 53 65 77 58 70 83
λ = 0.22 7 17 28 39 51 64 77 58 71 85
λ = 1.00 0 5 18 32 46 61 76 60 75 92
Table 4.8: Equilibrium monthly prices at different star rating levels
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Star Ratings
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
w/o QBP
λ = 0.00 .272 .255 .238 .221 .205 .190 .175 .161 .149 .137
λ = 0.22 .249 .235 .221 .208 .196 .184 .174 .164 .155 .147
λ = 1.00 .159 .159 .159 .160 .162 .165 .168 .172 .176 .182
w/ QBP
λ = 0.00 .272 .255 .238 .221 .205 .190 .175 .199 .183 .168
λ = 0.22 .249 .235 .221 .208 .196 .184 .174 .201 .190 .180
λ = 1.00 .159 .159 .159 .160 .162 .165 .168 .210 .214 .218
Table 4.9: Equilibrium market shares at different star rating levels
Star Ratings
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
w/o QBP
λ = 0.00 39.94 36.55 33.35 30.37 27.61 25.07 22.74 20.62 18.7 16.96
λ = 0.22 35.50 32.87 30.42 28.15 26.07 24.18 22.48 20.97 19.63 18.46
λ = 1.00 20.29 20.26 20.32 20.48 20.74 21.11 21.60 22.21 22.94 23.78
w/ QBP
λ = 0.00 39.94 36.55 33.35 30.37 27.61 25.07 22.74 26.54 23.96 21.61
λ = 0.22 35.50 32.87 30.42 28.15 26.07 24.18 22.48 26.97 25.10 23.42
λ = 1.00 20.29 20.26 20.32 20.48 20.74 21.11 21.60 28.49 29.12 29.87
Table 4.10: Equilibrium monthly profits of a firm for different star ratings
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Star Ratings
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
w/o QBP
λ = 0.00 14.36 15.15 15.92 16.66 17.35 17.99 18.56 19.07 19.50 19.86
λ = 0.22 14.93 15.65 16.34 16.98 17.58 18.12 18.60 19.01 19.35 16.61
λ = 1.00 17.04 17.46 17.83 18.15 18.41 18.61 18.74 18.81 18.80 18.73
w/ QBP
λ = 0.00 14.36 15.15 15.92 16.66 17.35 17.99 18.56 24.99 25.68 25.27
λ = 0.22 14.93 15.65 16.34 16.98 17.58 18.12 18.60 24.90 25.44 25.88
λ = 1.00 17.04 17.46 17.83 18.15 18.41 18.61 18.74 24.59 24.60 24.53
Table 4.11: Consumer surplus at different star ratings
Star Ratings
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
Cost 622 635 648 662 676 690 704 719 734 750
Payment w/o QBP 757 757 757 757 757 757 757 757 757 757
Payment w/ QBP 757 757 757 757 757 757 757 794 794 794
Table 4.12: Cost and payments for different star ratings
133
Figure 4.1: Model fit – prices
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Figure 4.2: Model fit - plan payments
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Figure 4.3: Model fit - market shares
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This study evaluated the relative impacts of two policies, quality disclo-
sure, SRS, and quality bonus subsidies, QBP, on the welfare of the Medicare
Advantage market. My framework combined a “demand-and supply-side”
model that allowed for consumer heterogeneity with respect to preferences for
and knowledge of the SRS. I built a full demand and supply equilibrium model.
On the demand side, I allowed consumers to learn about quality in a Bayesian
fashion after the introduction of the SRS. To separately identify consumers
who were not aware of the SRS from consumers who did not care about the
SRS, I surveyed 624 nationally representative Medicare beneficiaries and, I di-
rectly asked them about their knowledge with respect to the SRS. Within the
survey, I conducted a conjoint analysis to elicit respondents’ preferences for
star ratings. I combined these stated preference with revealed preference choice
data to estimate the remaining parameters of the main demand model. On the
supply side, I allowed insurers to choose both prices and quality, endogenizing
the information environment and the financial incentives they received.
My survey found that almost 80% of the population was unaware of the
SRS. The estimates of the survey showed that respondents who reported they
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were aware of the SRS placed a monthly value of $25 on an extra star rating,
while the respondents who reported they were unaware of the SRS placed a
value of $20 per month on an extra star rating. On the supply side, I found
that an extra star rating costs a firm slightly less than consumer willingness
to pay for it, and the firms’ choices were governed by noise, which prevented
them from perfectly predicting the final level of quality that would arise. My
welfare analysis showed that both the SRS and the QBP improved quality.
Interestingly, if 50% of the population was aware of the SRS, the “demand-
side” policy itself would be enough to lead to the levels of quality the market
is currently experiencing under the implementation of both SRS and QBP.
The most striking result was that 75% of the government expenditures for
providing quality bonuses are not rationalized by welfare improvement.
I limit my attention to analyzing welfare as it is traditionally defined as
the sum of firm profits and consumer surplus. My study remains agnostic on
whether the QBP generates a potential positive externality or if it just distorts
the market by wasting almost $1.2b annually. This positive externality could
take the form of a healthier Medicare population due to the higher quality the
market experiences. However, [1] show that star ratings are not associated
with any commonly used proxies of health outcomes in this particular market.
Another potential externality of the QBP could take the form of correcting the
distortions that arise when consumers have inaccurate beliefs about quality.
The investigation of this possibility is left for future research.
Another simplification of my model is that it assumes that star ratings
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are perfectly informative. Data limitations prevent me from separately identi-
fying how much consumers value star ratings and how much they value quality
per se. Specifically, given the discrete choice model of the conjoint analysis,
preferences for star ratings–captured by the coefficient βsi –effectively reflect a
combination of consumer preferences for the actual quality–clinical outcomes
and customer satisfaction–and the weight consumers put on the signals the star
ratings give them. Consequently, I cannot make conclusions regarding the ef-
ficacy of star ratings as signals of quality or whether the dimension of quality
the star ratings are signaling on is indeed valuable to consumers. A potential
solution to address this issue would be the introduction of Bayesian assump-
tions in the conjoint experiment along with an additional round of surveys
that would introduce variation in the prior beliefs of the survey respondents.
Such a task is left for future research.
Finally, the high cost of the QBP leads to many questions that open av-
enues for future research. It would be interesting to investigate whether bonus
schemes that depend on the relative performance evaluation of firms could be
more efficient. Relative performance evaluation refers to the evaluation of an
agent’s performance relative to that of a peer. This type of bonus scheme can
be efficient in the event that a principal, in this case the government, does not
have perfect information about the agent’s cost to produce quality. Introduc-
ing a scheme that assigns bonuses to firms based on their performance relative
to their competitors’ performance not only induces competition in quality, but
also solves the problem of the asymmetric information. Evaluating this type of
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scheme requires a model that accounts for the interaction between the princi-






More on the Institutional Details
1.1 More on the Star Rating System
This section describes the methodology followed by CMS for the cal-
culation of star ratings. CMS classifies contracts into three types; MA-only
that offers Part C benefits only, PDP that offers Part D benefits only, and
MA-PD that offers both Part C and D benefits. Each contract type is rated
over a number of performance measures (MA-only up to 32, PDP up to 15,
and MA-PD up to 441) that span five broad categories that are consistent with
CMS’s goals. These categories are the following:
1. outcomes that refer to a beneficiary’s health resulting from the provided
care,
2. intermediate outcomes that help move closer to true outcomes,
3. patient experience that refers to a beneficiaries’ perspective on the care
they received,
144 is the sum of 32 and 15 after subtracting 3 measures that overlap between MA-only
and PDP contract types.
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4. access that refers to any issues that may create obstacles in receiving the
needed care, and
5. process that refers to the method by which health care is provided.
Every year, CMS reviews the measures constituting these categories, and de-
pending on their reliability, potential data issues and other received feedback,
it makes changes on the current measures, deletes and/or adds redundant
and/or more appropriate measures, respectively.
Star ratings are reported in five different levels.2 These are:
1. base level that reflects individual metrics comprised of numeric data
(percentage scores),
2. star level that reflects star ratings calculated based on algorithms con-
verting base level metric rates on a 5-star scale,
3. domain level that reflects a second level into which each metric grouped
with similar metrics (at a star level),3
4. summary Part C (Part D) level that reflects metrics (at a star level)
grouped together to form the Part C (Part D) summary for a contract,
and
2This description is based on the latest version of the 2015 data available. Previous
years’ forms of the reported data were similar with the difference that before 2011 overall
star ratings are not reported.
3Totally, there are 9 domains comprised of up to 47 measures. MA-only contracts are
measured on 5 domains, PDP contracts on 4 domains, and MA-PD contracts on all 9
domains.
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5. overall level that reflect Part C and Part D metrics (at a star level)
grouped together.
The domain rate is the unweighted mean of the individual star ratings. To
receive a domain rate, the contract must meet or exceed a minimum required
number of individual metrics. The summary Part C, Part D, and overall MA-
PD star ratings are weighted averages of the individual star ratings. To receive
a Part C, and/ or a Part D summery rate, a contract must meet a minimum
required number of individual metrics. For the Part C and D summary rates,
half stars are also assigned to allow more variation across contracts. Lastly,
for MA-PD contract types to receive an overall rate, the contract must have
stars assigned to both Part C and D summary rates, and the overall star rating
is calculated using a weighted average of the Part C and D summary rates.
For the overall star rates, half stars are also assigned to allow more variation
across contracts.
1.1.1 Recovering Continuous Levels of Quality
Over the period of 2008-2016 the algorithm changed twice; once in
2012 and then in 2016. I used the yearly algorithm as it was provided by CMS
along with the individual star rating data to construct continuous levels of
quality (i.e. the average summary rates). Regardless of the changes occurred
during this time, generally, in the main algorithm the part C and D summary
rates were calculated by taking a weighted average of the individual Part C
and D metrics, respectively. CMS uses both the mean and the variance of
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individual metrics. Specifically, an “integration factor” was calculated and
added to the mean score for the reward of high performing for a long period
of time contracts. There were a few overlapping metrics between the part C
and D individual metrics which were excluded for the calculation of the overall
star ratings. Below, I describe the main steps of the algorithm I followed.
1. Classify contracts as “MA only”, “PDP”, and “MA-PD” if offering only
Part C, only Part D, and both Part C and Part D benefits, respectively.
2. Generate the weights each individual metric receives.
3. Calculate the “MA-only” rate as follows:
(a) Calculate the Part C weighted average with and without the im-
provement metric.
(b) Calculate the Part C weighted variance with and without the im-
provement metric.
(c) Categorize both versions of weighted average as (i) below 65th pc-
tile, or (ii) above 65th and below 85th pctile, or (iii) above 85th
pctile.
(d) Categorize both versions of weighted variance as (i) below 30th
pctile, or (ii) above 30th and below 70th pctile, or (iii) above 70th
pctile.
(e) Develop the “integration” factor for both versions (with and with-
out improvement) depending on the mean and variance categories
146
generated above.
(f) Add “integration” factor to the mean score for both versions.
(g) If a contract has Part C weighted average without the improvement
metric less or equal to 2, keep that level of quality. If a contract has
Part C weighted average without the improvement metric greater
or equal to 4, keep the maximum of the Part C weighted average
with and without the improvement metric. For all other cases, keep
the Part C weighted average with the improvement metric.
4. Calculate the “PDP” rates following the same steps as in “MA-only”.
5. Calculate the overall “MA PD” rates: follow the same steps as in “MA
only” and “PDP” cases excluding the overlapping measures.
6. Create Part C, D and overall scores rounding to the nearest half star.
During the period of interest CMS changed the algorithm it used to
construct the final star ratings a few times. This fact can generate concerns
on whether the comparison between the distributions over time is credible. To
address this issue, I also constructed a measure of continuous quality using the
algorithm CMS used in 2016 and holding it constant for all the years of my
analysis. Figure 1.1 displays how the distributions of this version of quality
evolved over time. Overall, we observe a similar shift of the distributions
to the right and a multimodal shape beginning of 2012 and becoming more
distinct as we get close to 2016. It is interesting to notice the main difference
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between this figure and figure 2.4.The distributions in this figure are almost
uni-modal closer to 2008 and become multi-model closer to 2016, whereas the
distributions in figure 2.4 present a more multimodal pattern across all years.4
The pattern of the distributions in figure 1.1 implicitly suggests that in 2008,
when insurers did not know the algorithm CMS would use in 2016, they could
not target overall quality very well, but getting closer to 2016 they could target
better.
1.2 Identification challenge
To better understand the identification challenge, assume that the star
ratings are perfectly informative, i.e. w = 1 and that preferences for quality,
qkmt are represented by a simple random coefficient, βi = β · Φi, where Φi
is a discrete random variable that indicates whether consumer i cares about
quality, qkmt and follows the Bernoulli distribution, Φi ∼ Bern(φ) as follows:
Φi =
{
1 w/ prob. φ
0 w/ prob. 1− φ
. (1.1)
Supposing that information given by the SRS reaches out to everyone (as
it is commonly assumed in the literature), i.e. that λi = 1 ∀ i, the utility
4Remember that continuous quality in figure 2.4 is adjusted to the changes CMS makes
annually on the algorithm it uses.
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specification takes the following form:
E[uikjmt|xkjmt, rkmt, θi, εikjmt] =
=
{
q0 + αipkjmt + β(rkmt − qTM) + γxkjmt + ξkjmt + εikjmt if Φi = 1
q0 + αipkjmt + γxkjmt + ξkjmt + εikjmt if Φi = 0
.
(1.2)
Since star ratings, rkmt are perfectly informative on quality, qkmt, if the con-
sumer cares about quality, her preferences will be represented by β, otherwise
her preferences will be represented by a zero mass point as Part (A) of figure
1.2 also illustrates. However, if we take into account the fact that there are
consumers that are not aware of the SRS and in case µ0 = qTM , the utility
specification takes the following form:
E[uikjmt|xkjmt, rkmt, θi, εikjmt, λi] =
=

q0 + αipkjmt + β(rkmt − qTM) + γxkjmt + ξkjmt + εikjmt if Λi = 1,Φi = 1
q0 + αipkjmt + γxkjmt + ξkjmt + εikjmt if Λi = 1,Φi = 0
q0 + αipkjmt + γxkjmt + ξkjmt + εikjmt if Λi = 0,Φi = 1
q0 + αipkjmt + γxkjmt + ξkjmt + εikjmt if Λi = 0,Φi = 0
.
(1.3)
Equation 1.3 clearly indicates that behind the zero mass point there are hid-
den more consumer types than just simply consumers who do not care about
quality as Part (B) of figure 1.2 also illustrates. More importantly, since differ-
ent consumer types can have different preferences for quality, not taking into
account their existence can lead to biased welfare analyses. In a more flexible
model where preferences for quality, qkmt allow for more flexible substitution
patterns it is even more cumbersome to separately identify different consumer
types.
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Φi = 0,Λi = 1
Φi = 0,Λi = 0
Φi = 1,Λi = 0
Φi = 1,Λi = 1
0 β
(b) Flexible version
Figure 1.2: Identification challenge
151
Appendix 2
More on the survey
2.1 Data quality
Respondents were guaranteed that any of the information they would
provide would be kept confidential and that their responses would only be pub-
lished at an aggregate level. With the exception of the demographic questions
for which people tend to be sensitive, all respondents were forced to answer
all questions. Although this increased the risk of respondent dropping out of
the survey, it also guaranteed that the collection of the information would be
consistent and the data set fairly balanced.
To test the quality of my survey data I followed a series of tests. First, I
checked that indeed all respondents matched the screening questions. Second,
I checked whether the state of their current residence was in alliance with the
zip-code they provided. Third, I excluded respondents who spent less than 1/3
of the average length the survey would take a respondent. Fourth, for a group
of respondents that were at the low end of the distribution of the length they
spent to take the survey, I checked the extent to which they were choosing
consistently the same options in the conjoint experiments and/or whether
consistently chose the same level of importance in all the plan characteristics
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of the relevant question I provided. Lastly, I checked whether the answers they
provided in the open-ended questions were indeed related to the topic and did
not reveal any confusions.
Concerns regarding potential inattention with respect to the survey
might arise, overall. To minimize such concerns, I set the option to advance
to the next question not to appear for the first few seconds each question is
available and I recorded how long it took each respondent to take the entire
survey and to respond each separate question, as well. The average length
of the survey was 8.4min. The average time respondents spent on the first
question that explain them the context and the goal of the survey was 40sec.
The average time they spent to answer the awareness question was 30sec.
Lastly, the average time they spent on the conjoint experiment was 1-2min
with most of the time spent on the first two questions.
2.2 Survey Questionnaire
1. What is your age?
2. In which state do you currently reside?
3. See Figure 3.2
4. Sometimes Medicare-eligible individuals get their health insurance plans
partially or fully paid for by their current or previous employer. Please
read the options below carefully, and choose the one that applies to you.
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• My former/current employer pays for/helps me pay for my health
insurance plan.
• My former/current employer does not help me pay for my health
insurance plan
5. Have you ever been enrolled in a Medicare Advantage plan?
• Yes
• No
• I do not recall






• Other. Please indicate.
• I do not recall
7. When did you join your current Medicare Advantage plan?
• In the last open enrollment period for 2020.
• 1 year ago
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• 2 years ago
• 3 years ago
• 4 years ago
• 5 years ago
• More than 5 years ago. Please indicate how many years ago.
• I do not recall
8. What plan were you enrolled in before?
• A Medicare Advantage plan different from my current plan.
• I was in Original Medicare
• I was not eligible for Medicare
• Other. Please explain
9. To help beneficiaries find the insurance plan that best matches their
needs, Medicare rates Medicare Advantage plans on a “star” scale from
1 to 5, with higher stars indicating higher quality.
Every year before the enrollment period begins, each plan is assigned an
Overall Star Rating that indicates different levels of quality in terms of
health outcomes of the people who enroll in the plan, the way plans help
enrollees manage their chronic conditions, members’ experiences with
the plan, access to medical care, as well as customer service.
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Do you remember seeing/ hearing/ reading about Overall Star Ratings
for Medicare Advantage plans?
• Yes
• No





• I do not recall
• Other. Please explain












• I do not recall
12. You indicated that you currently know about the Star Rating System.
Did you know anything about it when you originally decided to receive
your Medicare coverage from Medicare Advantage?
• Yes
• No
13. You indicated that you currently know about the Star Rating System.
Did you know anything about it when you originally decided to join your
current health insurance plan?
• Yes
• No






• I do not recall
• Other. Please explain
15. If Original Medicare was suddenly unavailable, and you had to choose
from the existing Medicare Advantage plans in your area, would you take
the Overall Star Ratings into consideration?
• Yes
• No
16. If your health insurance plan suddenly stopped being offered, and you
had to choose from a set of other Medicare Advantage plans, would you




• I already know the information the Overall Star Ratings provide.
• I do not understand the information the Overall Star Ratings pro-
vide.
• I am not interested in the information the Overall Star Ratings give
me.
• I do not trust this Star Rating System.
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• I do not find the Overall Star Ratings very informative
• Other. Please explain
18. Approximately, how much is the monthly premium of your current Medi-
care Advantage plan?
• The approximate monthly premium of my current Medicare Ad-
vantage plan is: (Please enter your answer in the box below)
• I do not recall
19. See figure 3.4
20. If the two plans presented below were identical in every other way except
for the following two characteristics, which one would you choose to enroll
in?
Note: There is no right or wrong answer. You should select the option
that best reflects your personal preferences.
• Plan1: Monthly premium: $21 Overall Star Rating: 2
• Plan2: Monthly premium: $29 Overall Star Rating: 2.5
21. If the two plans presented below were identical in every other way except
for the following two characteristics, which one would you choose to enroll
in?
Note: There is no right or wrong answer. You should select the option
that best reflects your personal preferences.
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• Plan1: Monthly premium: $52 Overall Star Rating: 5
• Plan2: Monthly premium: $32 Overall Star Rating: 4
22. If the two plans presented below were identical in every other way except
for the following two characteristics, which one would you choose to enroll
in?
Note: There is no right or wrong answer. You should select the option
that best reflects your personal preferences.
• Plan1: Monthly premium: $52 Overall Star Rating: 3.5
• Plan2: Monthly premium: $87 Overall Star Rating: 5
23. If the two plans presented below were identical in every other way except
for the following two characteristics, which one would you choose to enroll
in?
Note: There is no right or wrong answer. You should select the option
that best reflects your personal preferences.
• Plan1: Monthly premium: $0 Overall Star Rating: 3
• Plan2: Monthly premium: $49 Overall Star Rating: 5





25. Who helped you?





• My insurance company
• Other. Please explain
26. How did they help you?
• They suggested/chose a plan for me
• They showed me the Medicare Plan Finder website at Medicare.gov/find-
a-plan
• They helped me use the Medicare Plan Finder website at Medicare.gov/find-
a-plan.
• Other. Please explain
27. See Figure 3.9
28. Is there anything else you that you took into consideration before making
your annual health insurance choice for 2020?
• Yes. Please specify
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• No
29. On a scale from 1 to 100, how satisfied are you with your current Medi-
care Advantage plan?
30. On a scale from 1 to 100, how satisfied are you with the health care you
receive from Original Medicare?










33. What is your ethnicity?
• White
• Hispanic or Latino/a
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• Black or African American
• Native American or American Indian
• Asian/Pacific Islander
• Other. Please specify






35. How much do you spend on average every month on housing, utility bills,
food, transportation, healthcare, and other common leisure activities?
• Less than $1800
• $1801 - $2500
• $2501 - $3400
• $3401 - $4200
• $4201 - $5000
• Above $5000








• Other. Please specify
37. What is the 5-digit ZIP code of your current residence?
38. Is there anything else at all that you would like to share about Medicare
Advantage?
39. Is there anything else at all that you would like to share about Original
Medicare?
2.3 Answers to open-ended questions
Question: Is there anything else at all that you would like to
share about Medicare Advantage?
• I like the convenience of having only one plan to keep up with
• I like my plan
• The advantages far outweigh the extra cost
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• Excellent program
• Some questions are difficult to get answers from the plan quickly. This
can be extremely confusing when enrolling. At my age I feel lucky to
understand how this process works but feel advocates would be needed
for older folks
• Our income is very low so we must choose plans with zero monthly
premiums. However, the copays have gotten increasingly more expensive
and more frequent for us as our chronic conditions worsen with age and
we are now at the point of picking and choosing which specialist visits
we must schedule and which are “optional” (none, really) and have to
be skipped due to the cost.
• I am glad that there are several local Medicare Advantage plans to choose
from that I do not have to pay anything above the monthly premium
that is taken out of my Social Security check
• Need more plans for Hawaii county
• Couldn’t believe I could only receive benefits in Palm Beach County
• Never have used the service
• I am extremely happy with the provider I have chosen
• I would like to be able to talk with someone who is NOT attempting to
sell me on a plan
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• Don’t get “X” plan!
• I do not want Medicare totally privatized
• I get excellent customer service and I am grateful for that
• Terrific
• Very good for the cost. Mine is $0
• Great plan
• That it has been a good plan for me
• It also has been very helpful
• Pay less premium monthly
• It should not cost so much and the deductible should not be so high
• Nothing I can think of right off the top of my head
• I love it, I don’t pay a monthly premium in my area
• It’s worth the small cost for the premium coverage
• I had two heart attacks last year and had it not been for my insurance,
my bill would have been over $150000
• The plans with very low premiums are not worth the money
• Excellent coverage
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• Congress better not mess with it
• Do not yet have enough trust in them to use
• Would like it to cover dental
• I still do not understand stars
• Yes, great coverage and picks up what Medicare doesn’t cover
• What good is it if it costs more than its worth?
• Medicare advantage is much better than just Medicare
• I do not understand why it is not marketed more aggressively
• Show offer eye and dental
• Every thing has a co-pay now
• I like my plan
• I am happy with it
• Overall it is a better alternative to “Original Medicare”
• Not at all impressed especially with doctor choices unless cost is of the
utmost importance to purchaser
• No except they might try bargaining with the pharmaceutical industry
so that people could afford to take the medications they require
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• The little I know about it is that it too complex and said to be ever-
changing
• Like plan
• Hospitals and medical reps. should accept any paying insurance
• I am very satisfied with my plan
• I have a great plan
• My only problem has been that the network is very restrictive
• The main variable to me is how much I trust the company providing it
and how fair they are with their coverages. I have had “X” for 11 years
and they are very easy to work with, easy to talk to, fair and balanced
• Medicare advantage works great for me
• I am very pleased with my Medicare Advantage plan
• I am happy with it
• Wonderful plan
• Has worked very well for me
• Easier to use than Original Medicare
• I feel they need to offer much better coverage for vision & dental
• You will need it because Medicare coverage is bare bones
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• I like my plan
• It varies by county - you cannot pin hole the advantage programs into a
lump category
• The plan that I have is great
• Thank you for the opportunity to be able top share my feedback for this
survey
• Great plan
• “X” plan is best I’ve found
• My plan has been great it pays for a lot of the routine items but I bought
a policy with extra benefits sadly not everyone can afford that type of
plan
• I appreciate Medicare Advantage - hope it lasts
• I like my $131.00 monthly reduction
• It is health insurance
• We began with “X” plan, and it is now “Y” plan
• I would like more in-network providers.
• Great option if money is an issue
• It is a must to have
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• Dental coverage is restricted to a HMO
• Does it live up to the hype
• I love it
• I think that it is a good idea and affordable
• I can’t think of anything else
• I like what I have
Question: Is there anything else at all that you would like to
share about Original Medicare?
• It’s not free
• It is a great program
• Excellent program
• I’ve never had Original Medicare
• Does not cover dental nor vision and only minimal other medical
• I am glad that there are other options available that provide more ben-
efits that what Original Medicare offers
• No - other than the cost & yearly increase
• gGad it is here for me
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• The “gap” is a nuisance
• It never paid for any of my care
• Original Medicare is so much better than “X” Advantage Plan. I got
much better coverage with the Original
• I love my plan with “X”.
• I am concerned because I am withdrawing my IRA and now my Medicare
insurance is almost doubled
• Doesn’t cover enough. Should cover custom shoe orthotics even if you
don’t have diabetes
• Should also make payments on my health care. I pay a premium for this
• Definitely not as good as Medicare Advantage
• It has been very helpful
• No, other than I am very happy with what I have
• It should not cost so much
• Requires extremely expensive MidiGap policy like what I used to have
over 6 years ago
• Not as complete as possible
• It is ok
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• Hope it stays for retirees only. Should not be part of national health
care plan
• It works fine for me
• It is terrible
• I really would like to see a care system that is regulated across the board
which would weed out competition and high cost
• I think it is a good plan except for giving coverage to those who do not
earn it
• Cost of premiums raises more than SS increases. Hard to keep up
• Wish they could bargain with the pharmaceutical companies to reduce
prescription prices.
• Original Medicare with good supplemental insurance has resulted in mp
co-pays and less than $500 out of pocket total in the 19 years I have had
this type of insurance. I would rather budget for have total insurance
when I need it than have to deal with co-pays and bills afterward
• It’s an excellent program, I am amazed at how well it covers everything
• I wish there was more included with Medicare benefits
• My health care plan is excellent
• Medicare was good Medicare Advantage is better
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• Would seem to be more expensive and more complicated than my Medi-
care Adv. plan
• It does not cover some very important procedures nor does it cover dental
procedures
• Thank you for the opportunity to be able to provide my feedback for
this survey
• No thank you
• Medicare is great but not all doctors want on to the plan which is not a
fair system to the consumers it should be treated like any other insurance
plan
• I need to understand more about the 80% coverage
• I do have a supplemental
• Happy
• Very complicated
• Wish drug plan was included. Plans available are not very good
Question: Is there anything else that you took into consider-
ation before making your annual health insurance choice for 2020?
• Portability
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• Out of network fees and acceptance
• Company increased benefits
• Annual deductible and my primary care physician
• I selected a different “X” plan because it offered an over the counter
benefit that the previous “Y” plan did not offer
• Yes, drug costs are big for me one year I selected a carrier that exempted
my insulin from the donut hole I just paid regular monthly co pay instead
of the rip off price
• I did not have a choice. No other company will accept me because of
current medical diagnosis
• Doctors who are in network and their ratings
• I have chosen to stay with the same supplemental insurance company
• I did not want to change
• Are my doctors in the network
• Main concern was network of providers
• Customer service
• Only that all my doctors participate in the plan
• Coverage outside US for emergency
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• Just drug coverage
• Formulary
• Agent advice
• Past experience with the company
• Current doctor is in the plan
• Hearing aid coverage
• Location of doctors and facilities and hospitals
• Doctors and hospitals included in the plan
• Nothing that I have not considered
• Drugs
• I have been satisfied with the coverage and price along with the ease of
accessing MDs
• Hospitals in network were even more important to me than doctors
• Continuity of coverage
• My preferred md in plan
• My overall satisfaction with the plan over the prior several years
• Areas of coverage
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• Overall cost for me, inclusion of doctors I want
• Prevention benefits
• Dental
• That my current doctors are in the plan
• Transportation provided
• What a pain it was to review all available options and insurers
• Making sure that providers that I use are covered by the plan
• How close was a doctor to me
• Had them the year prior and was very satisfied
• Has local doctors that I use and no copay for primary doctor
• Yes my doctor was on this plan
• I wanted to keep my agent who is extremely capable knowledgeable and
approachable
• The provider network
• Was my doctor in the plan
• Having my choice of health care providers Also if my coverage is available
in other areas of the country if I choose to travel
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• “X” Clinic accepts our insurance
• Doctors who accept medicare
• Choice of doctors and hospitals wherever I may travel in this country
• Ease of use and acceptance by my providers
• Recommendation from friends and family
• The doctor clinic that I go to accept my insurance with no copay
• PPO offered and enrolled in
• No out of pocket monthly premiums
• Location of providers
• The network of available doctors
• Location of facilities and physicians
• I made my choice not because it offered the best plan but because this
is what I could afford
• Vision and gym membership
• Quality care is not worth a small savings to me I can afford the better
plan
• Sizable monthly reduction
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• Location of service
• My doctor has to be in the network
• Wanted a plan with no deductibles no copays no referrals needed
• Rx covered
• Coverage and copay for hospital inpatient and skilled nursing facility
• Good Doctors
• The convenience of continuity
• Cost and benefits offered
• if my doctor was in network
• Complete coverage but expensive
• Availability and location of service
178
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